Thus, while I believe that the “original understanding” of the press freedom guarantee was much broader than Levy argued, there are more ambiguities about the history than have been discussed here. A judge would not be more justified in claiming that the historical evidence presented in this monograph compels some particular interpretation of the press freedom clause according to its “original meaning” than in claiming that Levy’s version of history or any other version of history compels one or other interpretation.

For Levy’s part, despite his view that the original understanding of the press freedom clause was narrower than many scholars had previously claimed, he expressed his happiness at his work being cited in support of libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment. But Justice Hugo Black, one of the leading libertarians on the U.S. Supreme Court in the postwar period, disagreed, declaring that Levy’s work to be damaging to a libertarian judicial interpretation of First Amendment freedoms.^[271]  Justice Black’s concern would be warranted only if somehow judges made their decisions based upon one or other version of history, or if a libertarian view of the First Amendment were somehow discredited by Levy’s research. But there is a much richer role for history in legal decisions than the quasi-Orwellian exercise of judges, appointed for political reasons, declaring from the judicial bench what the “true” version of history is. Constitutional law comes to us with a mixed legacy. The Constitution’s origin was a complex, sophisticated political process