publications verbally attacking the government. Jackson put no limitations at all on the right to oppose the government. He did not limit protected expression to what was true. While Jackson did not mention the doctrine of criminal libel or seditious libel by name, the premise of his speech was that punishing writers would violate freedom of the press. No one in the First Congress disputed Jackson on this point.

Representative Jackson’s speech is but one more piece of evidence of what press freedom under the First Amendment meant. It is not as if there were a debate in the First Congress over the scope of press freedom that was resolved one way or the other. Nor did Rep. Jackson attempt a full discussion of the history or legal doctrine of press freedom. His speech simply assumes that the principle of press freedom is broad enough to prohibit punishment based on publications that might be deemed objectionable by Congress. Since it is the only evidence available of what was meant by freedom of the press in the First Congress, it needs to be considered in any complete evaluation of the original understanding of the press freedom clause. Unfortunately, Rep. Jackson’s speech has been overlooked not only by Levy but by every other historian who has addressed this question. It should give pause to anyone who thinks that Levy’s work, or any other available historical account (including this one), actually addresses the pertinent evidence of what freedom of the press under the First Amendment originally meant.

5.2. Preamble to the Bill of Rights and Madison’s Speech Introducing His Proposals.

The Bill of Rights as passed by the First Congress included a preample:

THE Conventions of a number of the States having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence