to talk about his gunshot wound.  I further suggested that any information he might give could wait until after the trial, since in my opinion he is creating a spurious defense which now is supported by the very fact of the interview.

It therefore becomes necessary that I be furnished forthwith a complete report of this matter with the names of all persons participating.

In addition I hereby request an immediate and complete investigation, with detailed reports furnished to me, of each and every allegation made by Mr. Zeigler, and that each officer participating be ready to testify at the murder trial as to what his participation revealed.  This is absolutely necessary.

(Zeigler, Hadley, and Vernon Davids all deny that any OCSO deputy, or any prosecution investigator, ever tried to interview him about his loan-sharking claims.)

Additionally, Vernon Davids swore in a 1987 affidavit that Eagan and his assistants deliberately misled him about the location of evidence items, including Charlie Mays's shoes and Edward Williams's pants.  It is also clear that, by design or error, the prosecution failed to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence, including the Jellison tape.  As this is written, the courts are considering Zeigler's motion for a new trial, based in part on the suppressed evidence.

The use of the FBI Lab, rather than the Sanford facility, had great ramifications for the conduct of the trial.

The decision to use the FBI erected a wall between the defense and the evidence that went to Washington.  And FBI examiners are not subject too state subpoena; the state's control of the evidence and the experts allowed Eagan to arrange the footprint testimony of Herbert MacDonell in a perfect counterpoint to the FBI's Thomas Delany. MacDonell's testimony, regardless of its substance, would not have had such a maximum impact if Delaney had testified in turn.  Most damaging, Delaney could not be recalled to argue the validity of his work; a state employee would have responded instantly to subpoena.

We cannot assume that police and prosecutors chose the FBI in order to frustrate the defense; at the time, it was a sound, legitimate decision.  But the decision to exploit that advantage was Eagan's.

The slow pace of result from the FBI forced the prosecution to postpone its grand jury presentation until two and a half months after Zeigler's arrest.  This delayed the defense's ability to invoke discovery, while time was tolling on the six-month speedy-trial deadline.  Eagan might have begun at least informal discovery during February and March, but he did not.  His office finally released discovery material on the last hours of the last possible day—and then it was incomplete.  This may be an indication of the precariousness of the state's