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The Story of Civil Liberty in the United States

Chapter 7: Freedom and Social Thought

Subhead Links:

FREEDOM OF SOCIAL THOUGHT

THE climax of the struggle for liberty has been the conflict during the last fifty years between reformist and radical groups seeking to change society by some definite theory, and on the other hand, the police power of the state. Since the chief way to change society is by changing its mind, these groups need the widest freedom of organization and propaganda—the right to what Mill called “freedom of communication,” and which is here roughly termed “freedom of social thought.” This is a complex modern need, and includes freedom of belief and of research, freedom to organize and agitate in every way with protection against mob violence and any arbitrary interference. This chapter lists denials of these rights.

These social reformers believe that eugenics or anarchism or universal suffrage for example, will work a conscious amelioration in man's lot. They are moved often by humanitarian benevolence; more recently by a serious design to reform mankind by science. They are not new; their first activities in the United States were discussed in chapter III. After about 1825 they preached Utopianism, the rights of labor, sex equality, and the like. Then, one movement—the abolition of slavery—came to overshadow the others for half a century, though temperance and the rights of women were not neglected. Meanwhile, exiles from the older European civilizations, from about 1848 on, had brought more sophisticated ideas on social progress,—in anarchism and Marxian socialism. Then came the theory of evolution to give the social reformers a philosophy on which to base their hope of directing change. Thus, when the national intellect

recovered from the prostration of the Civil War, it began organizing for enquiry and propaganda along many lines.

The new ideas met two opposing forces: the conservatism of the authoritarian classes, and the inertia of the herd mind. The first opposed them because their privileges and profits were best maintained by the status quo. The masses opposed them from their instinctive fear of change, bulwarked by traditional religion and morality. This popular antagonism has sometimes been native and spontaneous; oftener it has been aroused and exploited by the ruling classes. They have even been clever enough to align the people against movements clearly in behalf of the people and against these exploiters. Popular opposition to birth-control, for example, has been fostered by the classes who profit by surplus labor, yet who themselves limit their own families.

The struggle resolved itself into one issue—to enjoy freedom of communication in spite of the police powers. Both the necessity for this freedom and also the nature of the police power must be better understood if the cases are to be clear.

You can change a democracy only by education. The rule of a tyrant is forbidden; and you can't use force,—for the people are the force, either by mobs or votes. You must change their minds. In a sense the entire modern struggle for liberty is for possession of the means of changing the people's minds, the means of education and the means of communication. They may be viewed as one, for communication in a large sense is but a public way of teaching. The social reformer, therefore, must enjoy the freest communication,—communication from a picket to a scab, from a nurse to a woman weary of child bearing, from a Socialist on a soap-box to a crowd in the public street, from the crowd to the President, from the press of an anarchist to his fellow-anarchists through the mails. Anti-liberty means to silence the picket by an injunction, the nurse by a birth-control ban, the Socialist by a nuisance ordinance, the crowd by breaking up meetings, the anarchist by a postal censorship. And all

these, please observe, are legal methods. Of course, both the advocate and his audience must have freedom of conscience—the right to believe whatever they think they find in the facts. They must also enjoy protection and the right to law, but these are the means, not the end. The end is communication; not indeed a new problem, but one in which new factors have been introduced by the mechanical extensions of communication, and by the fact that public opinion has become an almost ponderable force. For example, the postal censorship forbidding the mailing of a motion-picture film presenting problems of birth-control meant to be shown in clinics exclusively for women, presents a complex problem in liberty.

The question next arises then; “how has freedom of communication for ideas that are repugnant both to conservative interests and the people been denied?” Once it would have been done by mobs; but we find little violence against these social movements which is at all comparable to that used against Mormons or Abolitionists in the thirties. It is hard to mob an idea, and moreover an idea is not realized as a threat to the community. The mob spirit is not easily aroused against an abstraction. To mob a negro or a scab is a different matter.

Therefore, the suppression of disturbing ideas was turned over to the police power. Violations of liberty in this field are not extra-legal, but are achieved through the state itself. The new coercion was by laws, executives, and courts. It was far more effective than violence because it was legal and had the organized force of the community behind it. The effect is the same,—to enforce the will of the majority upon the rest of the community for what is claimed to be the welfare of the whole. The tyranny of the majority is given a new name—“the police power.”

Let us add at once that the police power is necessary, and that it has in its modern form accomplished many beneficial things. But let us add that it has been extended to permit very dangerous invasions of civil liberty. Moreover this new

power of suppression is precisely the same whether inspired by popular prejudices or the selfish intrigues of privileged classes.

This conflict between liberty and the police power is frankly admitted by the legalist:

Before the doctrine of evolution, natural rights were regarded as immutable, substantive, eternal, not to be changed by external conditions…. About the middle of the 19th century the courts of the country invented what is spoken of as the police power, which may be said for all practical purposes to be unaffected by the private rights theory. The government may exercise the police power unrestricted by the constitutional limitations to be found in the Bill of Rights.1

The following reconciliation is attempted by an authority:

Civil liberty is the freedom of entering into legal relations with others and of appealing in any manner to public opinion or sentiment. This liberty must be subject to manifold restaints in behalf of the public welfare, and as a constitutional right has no specific content…. But certain spheres of liberty may be singled out as withdrawn from the police powers in this sense that the pursuit of certain objects, or certain forms of activity cannot in themselves be regarded as elements of public danger. Such special recognition is given by our courts to freedom of religion, of speech and press, and of assembly, and by foreign constitutions and laws to the freedom of migration, occupation and association.

Most Americans would be surprised to learn that their cherished “constitutional liberties” have no specific content; and are only withdrawn from the police power as harmless forms of activity. When they mean anything, the police power is alert to interfere. It is therefore of supreme importance that we understand this vast power.

All the definitions are vague, as when Goodnow calls it

“the power which is exercised in the interest of public safety or convenience.” Roughly, it is the supreme coercive force of the community exerted upon its members for the sake of “safety, health, or morals.” In its prime function—the protection of life and property—it is the basis of our organized states, and cannot be objected to except by those who do not believe in organized states. In the emergency of war it protects life and property against external force, and is recognized as inherent in sovereignty. Both war and peace powers hold dangers to civil liberty. But in practice, the state's duty of protecting life and property must be conceded, and so also the dangers of its misuse.

But the police power proves to be extremely variable—at one moment reaching out to forbid the dissemination of birth-control, and at another so shrinking that it cannot prevent the toil of little children in field or factory. Civil liberty is chiefly concerned in its extensions. First, in its function of protector, it reaches out to cover acts such as speaking or printing, that present no danger to life or property, but are declared to have a “tendency” to create conditions from which such danger may arise. The police claim a duty to disperse or even forbid meetings and to censor publications that may conceivably sometime, somewhere, incite somebody to crime. Since there are no tests for such “constructive” crimes, the police power seizes a wide field for suppression.

The next step seems even more logical. If the police power is useful to protect us against loss of life and limb by violence why not let it protect us against such losses by disease? Good-now makes this interest in health the origin of the modern developments of the police power. Urban industrial conditions demand good health and at the same time menace it. The success of preventive medicine enabled the government to take measures against disease,—first against disease itself, then by the same logic against the causes of disease. It invented quarantines, vaccination, pure food regulations, safety laws and traffic cops. How beneficial much of this has proven! These protections of a man's bodily welfare were

justified on two grounds: first, sickness and death are both a current expense and a capital loss to society; second, the sick may communicate many of their diseases to the well. There were bitter struggles over the right to live and die your own way, even if you killed others en route. But generally in the field of health the police power has won out all along the fine.

But when the police power discovered that the causes of crime and diseases were not only physical but also social and moral, it forgot its common-sense basis in safety and health and undertook transcendental tasks. It was extended finally to protect us against states of mind or morals that were declared to be diseased and so to threaten the safety or health of the community. The psychological crimes of which the police gradually took cognizance were of four main kinds: (1) beliefs that were in some way inimical to bodily health (Christian Science); (2) beliefs that tended to undermine the moral basis of society (the Mormons' polygamy, or the advocacy of birth-control); (3) beliefs that threatened the form of the state (woman's suffrage or Socialism); (4) beliefs that denied the state itself, and so attacked the police power and its officers (anarchism).

Three interpretations of police power complete the machinery of suppression: first, its extension to cover words or acts which might have a tendency to produce mental states from which overt dangers might spring; second, the justification of preventative measures to keep persons from uttering words or performing acts with this dangerous tendency; third, the recognition by the courts of the right of executive officials to issue regulations which have far-reaching effects. The courts will not, for example, review an order of deportation by the Secretary of Labor or a revocation of second-class mail privileges by the Postmaster-General.

It begins by enforcing things that are good for the body and ends by enforcing things that are not good for the soul. It works by the quaint but dangerous analogy that quarantine

prevents small-pox, therefore, censorship will prevent Bolshevism! It proceeds from preserving the peace to preserving the status quo. This force for safety soon translates safety into “law and order” and this into “the established order.” It changes health into comfort, and comfort into peace of mind, which means no agitation, no freaks, no tampering with things as they are.

So we find the police power dabbling in all sorts of mysteries. It prosecutes the Mormons for polygamy and the Spiritualist for necromancy. It pursues the ignorant or avaricious for not sending their children to school. It amends the Constitution and prevents the drinking of alcohol. It forbids the circulation of knowledge of birth-control, yet itself experiments with the sterilization of the feeble-minded, and so tampers with a liberty of grave import though one not mentioned in the Bill of Rights. And it does all this, not because ignorance or drunkenness are bad for the fool or the drunkard, but because the fool and the drunkard are bad for the rest of us. The community takes to enforcing on the individual what it thinks is good for itself: and the only possible curb on it is to persuade the public that a given police measure has no value for safety and comfort.

The lover of liberty must concede the social worth of these achievements of the police power. But he must, when it oversteps the limit of protection from physical dangers, condemn it. He must resist when it asserts the right to police ideas. The only standard by which to test a change in ideas is trial and error. But the inevitable tendency of the police power is to make everybody conform to a common standard. It must quell every disturbance of mental peace; it obeys one law,—the law of averages. It never concedes that the individual has any right, capacity, or desire that cannot find satisfaction in the self-preserving purposes of the majority. Least of all can the police power be persuaded that the safety and health of society demand freedom of change. In theory of course, it accepts individual liberty as a healthful thing for society. Freund says:

Public policy assumes the superiority of the social over the individual interests. The highest conception of the state, however, repudiates the absolute and unquestioning subordination of the individual to society and insists upon the preservation of individual liberty as an essential factor in civilization, and one which will lead ultimately to a more perfect social welfare though it may produce temporary disturbances or delays in the accomplishment of what is believed to be the public good…. It is, however, regarded as contrary to constitutional liberty to exercise compulsory control over public opinion and agitation which refrains from the practice or incitement of violence, or from injury to private rights, and the constitutions attempt, in part ac least, to secure this liberty by special guarantees.3

Unfortunately governments do not act upon this “highest conception of the state,” nor will they tolerate “temporary disturbances or delays in what is believed to be the public good.” In many constitutions the guarantee of religious liberty contains a police power clause excepting from protection “acts against public safety or morals.” Nor will the post office transmit information on contraception though there is herein neither incitement to violence or injury to private rights.4 Freund neatly sums up the whole danger thus:

The exercise of the police power might conceivably serve the purpose of guiding or checking intellectual movements so as to further the ideas of the government of what is beneficial to society or state. Such a purpose is, however, disclaimed by liberal governments, and the guaranty of freedom of religion and of speech and press removes the pursuit of ideal interests on the whole from the operation of the police power.5

This seems too naive; the phrases “might conceivably” and “such a purpose is disclaimed by liberal governments” hint that the author's tongue was in his cheek. The cases presented here prove that governments habitually use the police power

to “guide and check intellectual movements,” and that the pursuit of “ideal interests” is not removed from its operation.

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

Freedom of conscience is the foundation of freedom of communication. We must be free to study anything and believe anything. These rights have been pretty well won, and science has the largest possible right of research.

In the religious field, liberty today means that you may believe and preach whatever you wish; but the police power will not accept your religious belief as justification for any act judged dangerous to the safety or morals of the community. You may hold any old faith or invent a new one. You may utter praise or contempt of the Christian religion, or of any other in comparison with the Christian religion. Religious belief is so assured that in New York it was held to be a violation of the Constitution to ask a witness if he were an agnostic.6 The old crime of blasphemy is almost dead. To call Christ a bastard and the Virgin Mary a whore, once fined by Chancellor Kent because it “undermined the government” is now held to be neither lewd or lascivious.7 There is an occasional effort to punish blasphemy:

Michael X. Mockus, a free-thought lecturer … came to Waterbury, Conn., to deliver a series of lectures in the Lithuanian tongue to an incorporated Lithuanian Free Thought Association. He uttered some phrases alleged to be blasphemous under a statute passed in 1642. He was arrested, tried in the City Court, and found guilty … and sentenced to ten days in jail. An appeal to the District Court was taken where the jury disagreed, and a retrial was ordered for December 6, 1916. The case was apparently never heard.8

The Catholic Church suffered an occasional attack, due not so much to religious antagonism as to the fear that Irish and Latin Catholics were invaders who might be by priests formed

into a secret political machine to capture the state. The principal discrimination against them is in the public schools, which often reflect Protestantism. In the nineties a revival of the Know-Nothing spirit produced a considerable anti-Catholic agitation, half-sectarian, half-political, in the Middle West. Its organ was the “A. P. A.” or American Protective Association. The old issue of religious instruction in public schools was dragged out, and a few minor political victories were won on it.9 There was no serious trouble, though the Democratic Party, with which most of the Irish Catholics were affiliated, found it expedient to re-affirm the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty in its platform in 1896.10

Against Jews social discrimination exists, especially with respect to clubs, employment and exclusions from hotels. This antagonism is racial and economic as well as religious. But all of these discriminations against Catholics and Jews involve no real interference with belief.

There has been complaint that religious liberty is not complete because the state exempts church property from taxation and enforces laws for the protection of the Christian Sabbath, and against blasphemy of the Christian religion only. These are at once justified because they strengthen the police power, “for the good of society:”

It is alone needful to note that the justification of all such legislative action resides not in the demands of religion nor in the competition of one form of religion with another, but solely in the demands of social order, safety, and propriety … opposition to tax-exemption loses all force when the exemption is made for the good of society.11

Here we have the church used as an adjunct of the police power. The modern state is not concerned with man's religious ideas so long as he does not act contrary to the purposes of the state itself. If he does his religion is no excuse. The Constitution of New York asserts the superiority of the police power thus:

… but the liberty of conscience here secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.

And the courts have fortified this in such decisions as:

No man can be permitted to set up his religious belief as a defense to the commission of an act which is in plain violation of the law of the state.12

The statement of this doctrine for the nation touches the Mormons. In 1852 their Church proclaimed the dogma of plural marriages. They sincerely believed that women so “sealed” to an elder of the Church stood a better chance of salvation; polygamy was the will of God. Congress on July 1, 1862, passed an act declaring that every person who had a husband or wife living, yet married another person in the United States territories, was guilty of bigamy and punishable by a fine of not over $500.00 and by imprisonment for not more than five years.13 When the test cases under this law came before the United States Supreme Court, the following answer was made to the defense of polygamy under the First Amendment, guaranteeing religious liberty:

Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order … there never has been a time, in any State in the Union, when polygamy was not an offense against society, cognizable by the civil courts, and punishable…. It is impossible to believe that the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important element in social life…marriage: while, from its very nature the sacred obligation is, nevertheless, in most civilizations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law….

Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief

… they may with practises…. Suppose one religiously believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government could not interfere to prevent sacrifices? Can a man excuse his practices … because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the doctrines of religion superior to the law of the land; and in effect be to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name…. It matters not that his belief was a part of his religion; it was still a belief and a belief only.14

The complete repudiation by the Supreme Court of the power of religion to dictate our acts would surprise our Puritan, Quaker and Huguenot forefathers. It leaves nothing to religion but what the Court contemptuously refers to as “religious belief and opinions.” We are in this dilemma: if we want to preserve the idea of freedom of religion we must believe that the civil law by some gift of infallibility always expresses the true will of God; and this at once leads to an established church, in this case the church that believes in monogamy. That becomes the government church. This view was frankly stated by Justice Bradley in the Mormon Church Cases;15 that the religious argument was no defense since the prohibition of polygamy was based on “enlightened civilization and Christianity.” Or, second, we can throw religious freedom overboard and admit that the police power over religious practices arises from the ideals of the majority, the sort of tyranny already described.

What happened in Utah during the Mormon regency is too confused for this study. The Mormons violated the liberties of their opponents to the same degree their own had been violated. Their history is one of tumult, massacre, riot and official gunmen, called “Danites.” On the other hand their own rights to law and civil rights in politics were constantly denied. In other states Mormon missionaries in conflict with the community morality have suffered violence and deportation. Here is an example:

Elder W.S. Berry and Henry Thompson were laboring as missionaries…. A meeting was appointed on August 10, 1884, at the house of James Condor, on Cane Creek, Lewis County, Tenn. Elder Jones was reading a discourse at Mr. Garrett's house when suddenly a mob of men in fantastic garbs and masked faces … made him prisoner and proceeded to Mr. Condor's. They made the latter prisoner…. David Hinson entered the house where Elder Gibbs was engaged in selecting texts from the Scripture…. He took a gun from its hooks over the door and shot Elder Gibbs down. Elder Berry observed other of the mobocrats enter…. He simply bowed his head and received the bullets of the assassins and fell dead at their feet. Martin Condor engaged in a struggle with David Hinson, and while engaged some members of the mob shot him down and murdered him…. J.F. Hudson, step-son of James Condor was seized by two of the murderous ruffians, but tearing himself loose he shot and killed David Hinson, and then in turn was slain.16

Governor B.H. Bate offered a reward of $1,000 for the assailants. The violence was said to have been caused by the circulation in Lewis County by certain orthodox Christian ministers of the so-called “Red Hot Address,” purporting to have been made by a Mormon bishop. It was later proved fake.

The treatment of Christian Scientists very clearly shows the conflict between conduct prescribed by a religious faith and the police power. Criminal action has been taken against Science healers for the illegal practice of medicine, against parents and others for failure to provide orthodox medical attention for their dependents, and to enforce local quarantine and vaccination regulations on Scientists in spite of their denial of disease.17 Various attempts have been made by the States to forbid the practice of Christian Science, beginning in Rhode Island in 1887, but with little success. There is practically no interference with Christian Science as a religion though it is said that such a Church was once refused a charter

in Philadelphia. The interference has been with their theory of bodily healing as it has come in conflict with orthodox medical ideas. Certain other theories of medicine or healing have met with similar treatment.

In New York City, ordinances have been passed forbidding the practice of clairvoyance and other so-called spiritual revelations for money on the ground that defrauding of innocent persons resulted from the pretensions of charlatans. This has in some ways handicapped the scientific study of spiritism and embarrassed those who profess Spiritualism as a religion.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLAGE

Violations of freedom of speech and assemblage have been so constant and wide-spread during this period that no attempt has been made to list them. But some general evidence and an outline of the methods of interference are given. It is significant that the American Sociological Society devoted its entire annual meeting in 1914 to “Freedom of Communication.”18 Here, Professor Edward A. Ross said:

During the last dozen years the tales of suppression of free assemblage, free press, and free speech, by local authorities or the State operating under martial law have been so numerous as to have become an old story. They are attacked at the instigation of an economically and socially powerful class, itself enjoying to the full the advantages of free communication, but bent on denying them to the class it holds within its power…. It is inexpressibly surprising that the rights of free communication, established so long ago at such cost of patriot blood, time-tested rights which in thousands of instances have vindicated their value for moral and social progress, accepted rights which in the minds of disinterested men are as settled as any principles of human conduct can be, should with increasing frequency be flaunted by strong employers and set at naught by local authorities.19

Most of this suppression was accomplished through ordinances such as those against disturbing the peace, obstructing

traffic, unlawful assembly, vagrancy, unlicensed parades, unregulated use of halls, misuse of the parks, and the distribution of printed matter. The enforcement of such laws is usually a matter of discretion with the police—some of them are interpreted technically, as in the rule that three persons may constitute “an unlawful assemblage.” Some, such as disturbing the peace, are so vague that they cover a multitude of cases. The burden of proof, too, is always on the defendant. He is not allowed free exercise of his civil rights as the constitution intended, but must prove them as against the police.

The police themselves are not particularly to blame. Their function necessarily creates a tendency to suppression. They feel they should break up what they do not understand. The economic and political powers behind the machinery of government provide through bosses and bribery or through control of public opinion an aggressive attitude by the police toward radical movements.20 Judgment and sentence after arrest are usually a matter of summary action by police magistrates, who are a part of the machinery of suppression.

These ordinances are obviously necessary for other purposes and cannot be attacked on general grounds. It is difficult to prove that in a specific case intentional injustice has been done.

The use of streets and parks illustrates the situation. These are the natural meeting-places of the people, they hold a perpetual audience, they cost nothing, they are the forums of the poor.

The common use of the streets is, however, far more than a license…. It must be looked upon as one of the constitutional rights of the individual in so far as the individual is part of the general mass of the people which is designated as the public.21

Yet John Graham Brooks declared:

In more than one recent instance, the guardians of the law had to run to the books, after the emergency had

arisen, to learn what free assemblage meant, and what the law was in the bailiwick.

He quoted this specimen of absolute cloture on free speech in the parks of Los Angeles—which we do not believe became the law:

It shall be unlawful for any person to discuss, expound, advocate, or oppose the principles or creed of any political party, partisan body, or organization, or religious denomination or sect or the doctrines of any social or economic system in any public speech, lecture, or discourse, made or delivered in any public park in the city of Los Angeles.22

The control of meetings in public halls is exercised through the interpretation of fire, health, and building ordinances, nuisance laws, and intimidation of the owner or lessee, who is dependent on the police in many ways, especially for the renewal of licenses. Under these various threats, the hall-owner is forced to refuse the use of his hall whatever his own sentiments. Even meetings in private places are sometimes dependent upon how far the police can extend their power. A charge of nuisance or of conspiracy offers the opportunity to break up a meeting even if it is not later pressed. The use of publicly owned buildings is so regulated almost everywhere as to prevent real freedom of speech.23

The cases resulting from these various types of control are too numerous to cite. But typical violations of freedom of speech and assemblage are noted in connection with the Anarchists, birth control advocates and suffragists.24

The right to speak or write in any language should be noted in relation to freedom of speech. If a person knows only one language and that is under certain conditions forbidden, his rights are manifestly denied. English is specified as the state language in the constitutions of four states. In Oklahoma the public schools must be conducted in English; and there are similar requirements for the use of English in legal and other public relations in various states.

ADVOCACY OF BIRTH CONTROL

The advocates of birth control have had a difficult time as to freedom for agitation for their cause, and freedom to conduct a public clinic for information. Here are some of the facts:

In Portland, Ore., about 1915, Emma Goldman and Ben Reitman were arrested at one of Emma Goldman's public meetings for the distribution of a leaflet giving information as to the means of preventing conception. The meeting was broken up, and at the police station bail was fixed at $500, which the police sergeant declared must be in cash. With great difficulty owing to the late hour, the money was raised to release Emma Goldman. Reitman remained in jail. At the trial, Judge F.W. Stadter, sitting in place of the regular incumbent, imposed a fine of $250 each. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Judge William Gatens discharged the defendants, remarking that the leaflet gave only in a dignified way information which every woman ought to know and which the wives of the rich did know through the family doctor.

1916—April. The police of Akron, Ohio, refused to allow Margaret Sanger to speak on birth control.

May. The police of St. Louis, Mo., prohibited Margaret Sanger from speaking in the Victoria theater after the contract was signed, and the deposit for the theater paid.

July. Margaret Sanger was arrested for speaking in Portland, Ore., and five others for distributing a pamphlet, “Family Limitation.” At the conclusion of her lecture, they were taken in the police wagon to the police station where they spent the night, having refused to give bail. At the trial, Police Judge Languth, held that the pamphlet was in violation of the city ordinance and the law, but probably having Judge Gaten's decision in mind, he discharged the defendants with a reprimand.

October. Margaret Sanger opened a birth control clinic in Brooklyn, New York. She and Ethel Byrne, a nurse, were arrested for imparting oral information on

contraception under section 1142 of the Penal Code of New York. Fania Mindell, the translator who had given away or sold the book, “What Every Girl Should Know,” was arrested under the same section. They were released under $500 bail. Mrs. Sanger, having re-opened her clinic was arrested on a charge of maintaining a public nuisance, violating section 1530 of the Penal Code. The landlord was also served notice to eject her from the premises as harboring a public nuisance. This case had not been tried to July 1, 1919. The court refused a jury trial to the defendants. The Mindell case was carried to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the lower court reversed, and the fifty dollar fine returned, though no costs were allowed. Ethel Byrne went on a hunger strike when removed to jail and was pardoned by Governor Whitman.

1917—April. The police of Albany, New York, closed the doors of a theater in which Margaret Sanger was to speak.

1919—December. An article on abortion was considered obscene by the police of New York City, and Margaret Sanger and Kitty Marion were taken before a judge for writing and selling this article in “The Birth Control Review.” The case was dismissed, chiefly on the ground that the information was largely the same as in the book “What Every Girl Should Know,” declared not obscene by the Court of Appeals.

In New York City, William Sanger, Rose Pastor Stokes, Jessie Ashley, Emma Goldman, Ben Reitman and Kitty Marion have been arrested, some serving prison terms. In Boston, Van Kleek Allison was arrested for the same offence. In Pennsylvania, a woman, the mother of six children, was given nine months imprisonment for distributing “Family Limitation” in an Italian translation to the wives of coal miners.25

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

The most important means of communication to-day is the press. Public opinion is power; whoever controls the press enjoys power, and therefore liberty. The right of free,

cheap publication has become fundamental to all other liberties. The press has become the first instrument of social force. Word of mouth or in meetings is still powerful; but in these days of vast numbers and magnificent distances, when to insure the strength of a movement a whole nation must be organized behind it, the press is the chief tool. Hence the first thought of the social reformer nowadays is publicity. Naturally the police power seeks some means of controlling so extraordinary an agency for change. Once again the police face the difficult task of drawing the famous line (as imaginary as the Equator) between liberty and license.26 We discover that the police power attempts to limit freedom of the press locally by various censorships and nationally by restricting the privilege of cheap mail service. And the entire matter is confused by the supreme difficulty of setting any standard by which the state can censor or suppress. National restrictions are treated first as the most important.

THE POST OFFICE CENSORSHIP

The post-office department exercises a life and death veto on periodical publications by its control of cheap circulation through the mails. This censorship was first suggested in 1836 by the effort to exclude Abolitionist publications from the mails. Before that the government had concerned itself solely with the physical contents of the mails, not the psychological content. By 1860, though no law justified it, it had become customary not to deliver this so-called “incendiary” matter in the Southern States.27 The next step was the exclusion from the mails during the Civil War of certain pro-Southern newspapers published in the North. Postmaster-General Blair justified this exclusion as a war power of the government to protect itself from overthrow by the use of one of its own agencies. But his defense admits the beginning of a peace-time censorship. For he declared that he had, on his own executive discretion, excluded what he judged to be obscene matter. We have shifted from the

protection of public safety to that of public morals; and in the legitimate effort to prevent debauching public morals began the post-office censorship.28

Congress perceived that the executive must have authority for such acts, and passed a series of laws against the transmission of obscene matter and later forbidding information on abortion and contraception. (Acts of March 3, 1865; June 8, 1872; March 3, 1873; July 12, 1876, et cetera.) Extensions of the principle soon followed. In 1868 it was made a crime to mail letters or circulars regarding lotteries, so-called gift concerts, and similar enterprises (15 Statutes at Large 196); in 1872 the law against fraudulent matter was passed (17 Statutes at Large 323, c335, section 301); and in 1917 the South secured the principle it had vainly fought for in 1836, when the Randall-Bankhead law forbade transmission by mail into prohibition States of publications containing advertisements of alcoholic beverages. In 1917, Congress, using its war-power, passed the Espionage Act (June 16) which excluded from the mails matter that might interfere with the conduct of the war; and by amendment (May 18, 1918) extended the exclusion to matter opposing the form of government or criticising public affairs or public officers. The century-old rule of no verbal treason laid down in Respublica v Dennie was reversed. (See Chapter II.)

THE CENSORSHIP IS CONSTITUTIONAL

The Supreme Court has invariably declared each new extension of the censorship not to limit freedom of the press. The principle is laid down in a case under the obscenity statute of 1873.

In excluding various articles from the mails the object of Congress had not been to interfere with the freedom of the press, or with other rights of the people; but to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals…. But we do not think that Congress possesses the power to prevent the

transportation in other ways, as merchandise, of the matter which it excludes from the mails…. Nor can any regulation be enforced … so as to interfere in any manner with the freedom of the press. Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed without circulation the publication would be of little value.29

Ex parte Jackson, 106 United States Reports 727.

This decision recognizes two points that serve the cause of liberty: first, that denial of liberty of circulation is in effect a denial of freedom of the press; second, that if the government mail monopoly be closed as a vehicle of circulation there shall be no denial of the right to circulate in other ways. The essence of the matter for civil liberty, however, was stated in a separate opinion by Justice Field:

The difficulty attending the subject arises not from want of power in Congress to prescribe regulations as to what shall constitute mail matter, but from the necessity of imposing them consistently with rights reserved to the people of far greater importance than the transportation of the mail.

It may be more important that the people communicate freely among themselves than that certain uncommon offenses against public morals be punished.

There are three other factors in the working of the postal censorship: (1) the mail monopoly declared by the United States forbids private mailing organizations (Revised Statutes 3982, c. 9–40); (2) the refusal of the courts to review a postmaster-general's exclusion order on the general ground that an executive must enjoy discretionary power; (3) the refusal of the post-office department to pass upon the contents of periodicals in advance of actual mailing.30 The purpose of this refusal to interpret the statutes on obscenity, et cetera, is to prevent the charge of a pre-publication censorship; and the result is that a publisher can never tell in advance what he will be allowed to mail.

The procedure of exclusion is as follows. Any postmaster can, if he thinks a publication non-mailable under these statutes, hold up an entire issue while he sends a copy to the third assistant attorney-general at Washington. The latter who acts as counsel to the post-office department, renders a decision, and the postmaster-general if he affirms the finding, then orders the issue excluded. There is no hearing or appeal. An order of exclusion may be the first notice the publisher gets and this merely gives the reason as “Number ........ of the Postal Regulations.” There is no specification as to the offensive clauses, and since the meaning of the statutes necessarily depends upon the interpretation of general terms, the publisher cannot find out what the post-office objects to, or deduce any definition for future guidance. Consequently he must always play safe. Usually the barred copies are returned. But even if the issue be finally admitted to the mails the delay in a business in which regularity of distribution is essential, injures the publisher and if repeated may destroy his property.

The procedure for the total revocation of a second-class mailing privilege is similar, except that the publisher is granted a hearing at Washington (nowhere else), and may present such defence as the indefinite nature of the specifications permit. The restoration of the privilege, once suspended, depends solely on the will of the postal authority.

The objections to the censorship were summed up by Louis F. Post after investigation of exclusions on obscenity charges:

  1. Any periodical though it contain nothing obscene is subject to exclusion peremptorily from the mails … upon the mere order of an administrative official.

  2. Exclusion orders are made in accordance with precedents created by rulings in particular cases … but these rulings are secret and by refusing to define their limitations upon request the Department

prevents publishers from guarding against the penalties….

  • Publishers … are accorded no protection in the courts against unjust exclusions, not even if the exclusion be made in manifest bad faith…. The postmaster-general's dictum, right or wrong, and with good or evil intent, is absolute.

  • In practice the Post Office Department excludes periodicals … for publishing articles denounced as obscene which in fact are not obscene.

  • The law … affords officials of the Department a degree of opportunity for corrupt discrimination … unsafe to repose in any official and which ought to be carefully safeguarded by Congress.31

  • Further evidence of the distrust of the postal censorship was the petition of the American Newspaper Publishers Association to Congress that the publishers be given the right to judicial review of the exercise of the authority of the Post Office Department in the granting, withholding or withdrawal of the second-class privilege, the exclusion of improper matter or the interpretation and construction of the postal laws.32

    First-class mail, that is, private sealed letters, are held exempt from scrutiny by the postal authorities except upon a specific warrant as sacredly as if they rested in the desk of the addressee in his home. The Supreme Court declared:

    The Constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers thus closed against inspection (sealed) wherever they may be.33

    There were charges, however, during the Civil War and the late World War that the postal authorities were permitting the scrutiny of first-class mail either by their own officials of by agents of the Department of Justice. It has been held that the obscenity laws applied to sealed letters.34 And in

    connection with the revocation of second-class privileges under fraud or other orders, a sort of indirect censorship is exercised, since the post-office returns as “non-deliverable” all letters addressed to the alleged illegal receiver.35

    THE CENSORSHIP OF MORALS

    The chief interest here is in the application of the obscenity Statute to restrict discussions of sex. The merit of the police power over frauds, lotteries, et cetera is not in dispute.36 As sex has become less a mysterious medley of religious tradition and tabu, and more a scientific study in a self-conscious society, to be dealt with for the good of both the individual and the race, the desire for freedom of discussion has brought many serious and idealistic persons into conflict with laws based on conventional morality or on the concept that women or children are best protected from immorality by silence and ignorance. The control of vice is admitted necessary. No one desires obscene matter conceived in viciousness or for gain to pass through the United States mails. But as usual it has proved extremely difficult to preserve useful freedoms while punishing deliberate vice. The effect of mere words on sex themes is incapable of measurement; and the courts themselves have supplied no consistent standards. The net result has been that discussions of the morals of marriage (sex relations, divorce, eugenics, and birth-control), of radical ideas of sex freedom (the double standard of morals and “free love”), or of the health aspects of sex (prostitution, venereal disease, marriage certification and stirpiculture) have been attended with danger for the person who gave frank publicity to his views.37

    “THE COMSTOCK LAW”

    The suppression of publications by the Post Office, and the criminal prosecutions in the courts, were both based on the obscenity statute—the so-called “Comstock Law”—passed by Congress March 3, 1873.38 The form of the statute follows:

    Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious, and every filthy book, painting, picture, paper, letter, writing or print, or other publication of an indecent character … and every article or thing designed for … preventing conception or producing abortion … or the giving of information directly or indirectly, where or how or from whom or by what means any of these articles can be obtained is a crime….

    Anthony Comstock who fathered the act, had himself appointed a special agent of the post-office department without salary, and shortly afterward perfected an organization for the enforcement of the statute, which still exists as the “New York Society for the Suppression of Vice.” Later the New York Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to permit proceedings in that State against persons who could not be reached under the postal law.39 Only a few specimen cases are given here for Comstock himself gave the number of his prosecutions as 3,648, with 2,682 convictions. Most of these do not of course involve principles of liberty. He is credited with having destroyed fifty tons of books, 28,425 pounds of stereotype plates, 16,900 photographic negatives, and 3,984,063 photographs.

    The first important prosecution was against S. D. “Woodhull. A famous violator of the statute was Ezra H. Heywood, who was arrested November 2, 1877, for the alleged mailing of two books, Cupid's Yokes, a treatise on marital morality by Heywood, and Trail's Sexual Physiology. He was convicted in the United States Court at Boston and sentenced to two years hard labor in Dedham jail, June 25, 1878. He was unconditionally released by President Hayes, December 19. On October 26, 1882, he was lodged in Charles Street jail, Boston, for violating the amended act, but was acquitted by the United States Court, April 12, 1883.40 There was a famous trial of D. M. Bennett, March 18, 1879, in the Circuit Court at New York.41

    Moses Harman was prosecuted for twenty years beginning in April, 1888, when the U. S. District Court in Kansas

    imposed a fine of $300 and a five-year term at hard labor for mailing an obscene paper (June 18, 1886). He did not serve the term. In 1891, he was convicted and imprisoned for certain articles in his journal Lucifer. This sentence was later reversed because it omitted “hard labor.”42 In. 1903 Harman was still editing Lucifer (now in Chicago) dealing with sexual matters. The edition of December 17 was barred from the mails by the Chicago postal authorities, and confiscated under section 497 of the postal regulations. Harman was tried and sentenced to one year's imprisonment in Joliet penitentiary, Illinois, which he entered February 27, 1908. Other numbers of Lucifer were excluded (August 3 and 17, and October 12, 1905) for such crimes as referring to a book on the Post-Office index expurgatorius because it dealt with birth-control methods; the republication of an editorial from the Woman's Journal of Boston (though the original was not suppressed); and (high irony) the republication of an agricultural report by the United States Department of Agriculture!43 Editors found it dangerous even to comment on the case:

    In June 1890, J. B. Caldwell printed an article on the Harman case in his small weekly in Chicago, which was devoted to advocating continence in the marital relation. A proof of the article was furnished the superintendent of the mails… Washington stated that “the Department did not decide upon proofs submitted.” … Caldwell invited McAfee (agent for the Vice Society in the west) to inspect all the publications of his paper, “The Christian Life.” McAfee replied he was not a censor of the press and did not decide upon the mailability of matter. On October 15, Caldwell was arrested for mailing obscene publications. The specification was that one copy contained an article by the Rev. C. E. Walker, entitled “Marital Purity.” His bail was fixed at $500. Hearing has been deferred.

    In 1907, Eugenics, successor to Lucifer, was threatened with the loss of its second-class mail privilege.

    In 1895 a man named Wise of Clay Center, Kansas, sent a quotation from the Bible through the mails, and was found guilty of obscenity. In October, 1897, Henry Addis, Abner Pope and other members of the Ruskin Colony in Tennessee, were arrested for mailing obscene literature, and No. 34 of The Firebrand was confiscated by the postal authorities at Portland, Ore. In September, 1911, the Report of the Chicago Vice Commission was forbidden the mails, though this was the production of a very respectable and presumably scientific body.

    We may note that in most of these cases the alleged offenders were radical or free-thinkers, or more generally social and religious idealists, some of whom instead of painting the beauties of sex, believed it a very sinful and morbid thing. They were often opposed to licentiousness inside of marriage, and they sometimes achieved a sane conception of evolutionary eugenics. They were not scientific and were frequently foolish, but they were not intentional corrupters of public morals, nor indeed did their publications contain anything that could rightly be called unintentionally corrupting. They were pioneers and suffered the penalties. They won a freedom later used by others.

    We cannot go into the procession of cases in which the courts have wrestled with the whole matter of obscenity and the interpretation of the statute. The central doctrine is derived from an English case; “that is obscene which has a tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort might fall.” (Regina v. Hicklin, 2 L. R. Q. B. 569. Ex Crum Case, 19/1868. Trials of Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant.) A critic of the law gives the following summary:

    A glance at the decisions handed down during the forty years of Comstock's chief activity shows a truly amazing willingness to accommodate him in his pious enterprises. On the one hand there was gradually built up a court-made definition of obscenity which eventually embraced almost every conceivable violation of Puritan prudery, and on the other hand the victim's means of defence were steadily restricted and conditioned, until in the end he had scarcely any at all. This is the state of the law to-day. It is held in the leading cases that anything is obscene which may excite “impure thoughts” in the minds … of persons that are susceptible to impure thoughts,”44 or which “tends to deprave the minds ” of any who, because they are “young and inexperienced,” are “open to such influences”45 … in brief that anything is obscene that is not fit to be handed to a child just learning to read, or that may imaginably stimulate the lubricity of the most foul-minded … Words that “abstractly considered may be free from vulgarism” may yet be assumed by a friendly jury to be likely to “arouse a libidinous passion … in the mind of a modest woman” … The court failed to define “modest woman.”46 Yet further it is held that any book is obscene “which is unbecoming, immodest.47 Almost any printed allusion to sex may be argued against as unbecoming in a moral republic, and once unbecoming it is also obscene…. The defendant cannot allege in his defence that the offending work was put forth for a legitimate, necessary, and decent purpose.

    FEDERAL ACTION AGAINST BIRTH CONTROL PROPAGANDA

    The propaganda for the dissemination of information on the control of conception, known in the United States as the “birth control movement,” led by Mrs. Margaret Sanger, a nurse, has resulted in the suppression of publications and prosecution under the Federal obscenity statute. The following gives the facts:

    In February, 1913, the Sunday Magazine of the Socialist daily, “The New York Call,” was held up on account of a series of articles, entitled, “What Every Girl Should Know.” The specific matter complained of was a discussion of the effects of venereal diseases. After much protest and discussion the Post Office Department reversed the exclusion order. In March, 1914, the first

    number of “The Woman Rebel” was refused mailing privileges, and the copies submitted for mailing were confiscated. The May, July, August, September, and October numbers were also excluded and the copies confiscated. One of the paragraphs for publishing which the March issue was barred from the mails read: “It will also be the aim of THE WOMAN REBEL to advocate the prevention of conception and to impart such knowledge in the columns of the paper.”48

    After three issues of the “Woman Rebel” had been excluded from the mails, without the editor being able to discover what was the exact nature of the obscenity, the journal printed a “Defense of Assassination,” by Herbert A. Thorpe. This was done to force definite action, assassination and arson having been included as ‘obscene” by the amendment to the section 211 of the United States Penal law. In July, Margaret Sanger was arrested for violating the obscenity statute, but released on her own recognizance. October 5, a postponement of the trial was refused, and Mrs. Sanger went to England. She returned in November, 1915, and on February 18, 1916, all the cases against the “Woman Rebel” were dismissed.

    The detained copies were never returned to the owners.

    “The Birth Control Review,” successor to “The Woman Rebel” was detained by the Post Office for advertising a book, “Married Love,” by Marie C. Stopes. This book had been barred from the mails, although it was allowed to circulate in England. The November, 1918, issue was detained, without notification to the publishers, who discovered the detention only when the subscribers complained of not receiving the journal. Two enquiries elicited no information from the Post Office, but a letter dated November 20 declared the publication mailable. The effect of such delays on a periodical publication's circulation is apparent.49

    THE OBSCENITY STATUTE AS A CLUB

    The obscenity statute has been used as a club with which to attack other groups as well as those interested in freedom

    of discussion on sex. Socialists, anti-Catholics and physical culturists have been charged with obscenity in order to suppress their propaganda.

    In 1912 Hobart Coomer who published a Socialist paper in Oklahoma was sentenced to six months imprisonment for publishing an advertisement of a proposed edition of his periodical. The advertisement which was attacked as “obscene, lewd, lascivious, and filthy” read in part as follows:

    FREE LOVE EDITION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRAT, JULY 10, … The master class has always taught and paid their hireling teachers, preachers, authors (editors) and other able idiots to teach that woman is merely a multiplication table for the human species; that her only business on God's green footstool is to fry steak and onions and bearing soldiers and politicians…. They never, until recently, allowed her to exercise anything but her sexual apparatus. The Socialists have made a great discovery. They have discovered that women are human beings. They are getting paid for this great discovery by having “free love” and many other stupid hee-haws brayed in their ears. We are going to tell you in the Free Love edition why the Socialists believe women are human beings.

    There was nothing about free love in the paper. The above words formed the basis for the indictment. The case was taken to the United States Circuit Court which refused to change the decision.50

    In a previous case, Fred Warren, of Girard, Kansas, had published in a widely circulated Socialist weekly, The Appeal to Reason, charges based on affidavits against a deputy warden of the Federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, accusing him of sexual irregularities including homo-sexual practices with prisoners in his charge. He was brought into the United States District Court in Kansas for violating the

    obscenity statute. Judge Pollack sustained a demurrer to the indictment, declaring the publication justified by the purpose it sought to accomplish.51 Warren and The Appeal to Reason had been actually punished under a different postal law in 1903. The Socialists claimed it was an attack on their party and its chief organ. The prosecution was based not on matter published in the newspaper, but on the mailing of envelopes on which was printed: “$1000 will be paid to any person who kidnaps ex-Governor Taylor and returns him to the Kentucky authorities.” Taylor was at the time under indictment for murder, but was safe in Indiana because a Republican governor refused to sign extradition papers. Warren was indicted under part of the Act of September 26, 1888 making it a crime to put on the outside wrapper of mailed matter any language of a “defamatory or threatening character obviously intended to reflect injuriously on the character or conduct of another.” Warren was convicted and punished, but pardoned by President Taft, who was of the opinion that the action taken against him was too severe and actuated by antagonism to his Socialist activities.52

    The Menace, an anti-Catholic journal in Missouri was prosecuted under the obscenity statute for publishing extracts from the works of a former priest, these extracts having to do with the morality of the priests and the conduct of the confessional. The defendant claimed that a leading official of a Catholic organization had furnished the material to the district attorney, and that a number of Catholic societies had written to the Postmaster-General for the purpose of bringing a prosecution. The jury acquitted the editors.’58

    The next case concerns a person who claimed an interest in physical culture, personal hygiene, and so in right sex morals.

    The defendant was the publisher of a physical culture magazine in which in October, 1906 began an article “Growing to Manhood in Civilized (?) Society” … the career of a young man as an example. Through the

    activities of some unknown person with a motive, the attention of a Post Office Inspector was attracted to the three numbers; he purchased the same through the mail, and the arrest, indictment, and conviction of the defendant followed. He was sentenced to two years hard labor in the penitentiary and fined $2000…

    The suit against me was of local origin in the little village in New Jersey where the “Physical Culture Magazine” was then published. No intimation of impropriety in the story was received from any reader, and while in Washington the day following my arrest I was informed that the officials of the Post Office Department had received no complaints against my magazine…. In addition to personal obloquy resulting from this prosecution, and many false and slanderous statements concerning it, I have been made to suffer large financial loss … it will probably reach $200,000.

    Bernarr Macfadden, Statement on His Trial, p. 17.

    The United States Circuit Court upheld the conviction for obscenity: “It caters to a prurient taste…. The test is the tendency to deprave and corrupt the mind of those open to such influence.”54

    IS ANARCHISM INDECENCY?

    The federal executive authorities found the postal laws inadequate to suppress publications that discuss social questions in ways they opposed. They could not reach the anarchists, for example, and were forced to resort to technical rulings, thus:

    We moved in 1905 to St. Louis to publish our paper Regeneracion (an organ of the radical Revolutionaries of Mexico)…. Diaz used diplomatic channels…. We had complied with all the provisions of the postal laws in order to avoid this … and yet Mr. Cortelyou, the Postmaster General, with neither justification nor shame, declared that Regeneracion could not enjoy second class privileges because over fifty per cent of the copies were destined for circulation in Mexico.55

    There is some evidence that these technical postal regulations have been invoked against publishers whose real offence was the expression of radical political or social ideals. Here is how President Roosevelt attempted to supply the deficiencies of the statutes by his own ukase

    To The Attorney-General, March, 1908; By my direction the Postmaster General is to exclude La Question Sociale of Paterson, N. J., from the mails and it will not be re-admitted unless by order of the court, or unless you advise me that it must be admitted….

    Attorney-General Bonaparte to the President: I am obliged to report that I can find no express provision of law directing the exclusion of such matter from the mails … In the absence of any express provision … or binding adjudication, … in my opinion the Postmaster General will be justified in excluding from the mails any issue … which shall contain any article constructively a seditious libel, and counselling such crimes as murder, arson, riot, and treason…. Such action would be perfectly safe since at common law it is settled that the owner of a libelous picture, et cetera, is entitled to no damages for its destruction…. Hence Federal Statutes for punishing the Postmaster for detaining mail … would not operate.56

    This is a rare exhibit even in our history; the Attorney-General trying to nullify the First Amendment by such ancient devices as constructive crime, seditious libel, and the common law interposed to protect the Postmaster from federal statutes. There was “neither statute nor binding adjudication” to justify Roosevelt, yet the act was declared “perfectly safe” because they could not be punished.57 The periodical was actually excluded, but on a technical postal violation, not for its views. President Roosevelt transmitted the Attorney-General's opinion to Congress with a special message; and as result of the agitation we have (1909) the following hybrid addition to the obscenity statute, an excellent example of how the censorship on moral grounds is extended to other fields:

    And the term “indecent” within the intendment of this section shall include matter of a character tending to incite arson, murder, or assassination.58

    WHEN IS ART OBSCENE?

    The obscenity club has been used against the artist, graphic, plastic, literary, and dramatic. In 1882, Osgood and Company, Walt Whitman's publishers, submitted to the poet twenty-four passages in Leaves of Grass tor censorship.59 Backed by a threat of the United States attorney, they ordered these passages expunged before the book was allowed on sale in Boston. Foreign authors whose works have been proscribed in one way or another, are Rabelais, Boccaccio, Zola, Daudet, Balzac, Hardy (Jude the Obscure, and Tess of the d'Urbervilles) and Harold Frederic, (Damnation of Theron Ware). Frank Harris was deprived of a publisher for his Life of Oscar Wilde. George Moore's Memoirs of My Dead Life was expurgated. D. H. Lawrence's works were forbidden for a time; and attacks were made on Theodore Dreiser's Genius, David Graham Phillips' The Career of Susan Lennox, and Alfred Kreymborg's Edna.

    Scientific sex studies suffered equally with fine arts: Forel's The Sexual Question was brought into court as pornography; Havelock Ellis' works on sex barred from the mails at one time; and the publishers of Przybyszewki's Homo Sapiens were forced to withdraw the volume. Not all of these interferences were based on the Federal mail statute. James Lane Allen's A Summer in Arcady, for example, was barred from libraries, as were many other suspected books.60

    Plays have of course been barred under local ordinances. The list includes Du Maurier's Trilby, Bernard Shaw's Mrs. Warren's Profession, (later revived quite innocuously), Oscar Wilde's Salome, and the plays of Eugene Brieux. In Cleveland, Ohio, in 1906, Olga Nethersole had to omit the staircase scene in the play from Daudet's

    Sappho. A play was suppressed in Philadelphia because it was obnoxious to the Negro population.

    In the representative arts we have such incidents as a raid on the Art Students' League (New York City), August 2, 1906; and the removal from a confectioner's window in that city of a painting Triumph of the Chaste because it contained a nude woman. The confusion in municipal esthetic standards was humorously shown when a bronze Bacchante by MacMonnies was exiled from the Public Library by prudish Boston, only to find sanctuary in the Metropolitan Museum, New York. We must admit that the distinction between pornography and art is not always easy to make; indeed in some of the above cases there remains the uneasy suspicion that art was secondary to publicity and profits. But it is certainly dangerous to freedom in art to let commonplace and inexpert minds decide the possible effects of the nude or the sexual in literature.61

    THE CENSORSHIP OF MOVING-PICTURES

    The moving-picture may be treated here as a combination of the art and postal censorship. Here is a new and popular and powerful means of communication. Does it fall within the protection of the guaranty of a “free press”? Certainly not in words; and in fact there are very real differences. The press for example was conceived of as an instrument in relation to government, but the screen can hardly be so viewed save as it is profoundly educational. The more vivid emotional reaction to the picture than to the printed word taking place in crowds differentiates the problem from that of freedom of the press. Since the status of many pictures is so uncertain we only sketch the facts.

    Efforts have been made to create a federal national board of censors to pass upon films intended for inter-state shipment. This has not been done. The federal censorships have been of three kinds: First, censorship of all films imported into this country was created in the tariff act of 1909, to be exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury. This does

    not appear to have been widely applied.62 Second, films of prize-fights have been barred from importation and from interstate transportation, by the mails or common carriers. It is a crime either to deposit the film for shipment or to receive it from shipment. This is based on the brutalizing effect of such contests, though pictures of bayonet practice go through the mails freely. Third, it has been decided that the First Amendment does not cover the transportation of picture films in the mails. “The United States could refuse transportation to any film not subjected to its censorship. Pictures are far worse on public morals than mere words.”63 The court is here evidently extending the principle of the obscenity and lottery statutes that a government utility cannot be forced to carry what is regarded as immoral.

    The censorships and police regulations of moving-pictures by states and municipalities are too complex and as yet unsettled to be more than mentioned here. Boards have been quite generally granted the power to ban or excise parts of films or order their change. The police acting as ex-tempore censors, sometimes with the help of the clergy and other experts in art and morality, have forbidden exhibitions and revoked the licenses of halls. Pictures liable to cause race feeling or stimulate immorality have come under the ban.64

    THE COURTS AS CENSORS OF THE PRESS

    The courts also have acted as censors of the press by the use of their power to punish for contempt.

    Recently (1900–1914) in Colorado, Ohio, and New York, editors have been punished for contempt of court, which consisted in criticism published in their newspapers, and not in the presence of the court; and, therefore, having no direct tendency to disturb its orderly proceedings. In Colorado, perhaps in other States also, proof of the truth was excluded.65

    In Colorado, one Patterson was punished by a State court for contempt in publishing certain opinions on the conduct of

    a case before the Court.66 His appeal finally reached the United States Supreme Court which denied him redress.67 This method of bridling the press to the judicial hand was comparatively new, and its employment promised to be widespread during the first years of this century. It aroused this comment from an expert on free communication:

    The judge-made law of contempt of court for publications censuring judges is simply intolerable in a land of equality where judges are no more important to the universe than executives and legislators.68

    Justice Harlan dissented in the Patterson case, and declared:

    I go further and hold that the privilege of free speech and of free press belonging to every citizen of the United States, constitute essential parts of every man's liberty, and are protected against violation by that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding States to deprive any citizen of his liberty without due process of law.

    CENSORSHIP UNDER LOCAL POLICE POWERS

    Censorship of the press involving the suspension of publication and the raiding of publication offices with the destruction of property has been not unusual in the last forty years, under police powers granted by local and State laws, especially with respect to Socialist papers. The following list does not exhaust the evidence, but it exemplifies the various kinds of restriction:

    1888—The Alarm, Chicago, was suspended from April 8, to July 14, on account of its alleged anarchistic tendencies.69

    1893—The Free Speech edited by Miss Ida B. Wells, a Negro, was suppressed because she so fiercely denounced the lynching of some young colored men, and arraigned the authorities for failing to punish the lynchers. She

    was driven from Memphis, Tennessee, and formed an anti-lynching league in England, securing as members, the Duke of Argyll, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and others.70

    1906—Emil Ruedebusch, of Maysville, Wis., was fined for publishing Old and New Ideals, a pamphlet of radical social and sex philosophy.

    1910—The New Castle Free Press, in a free speech fight in New Castle, Pennsylvania, was charged with seditious libel under the revival of the obsolete doctrine of the common law. Four men, McKeever, Hartman, McCarty, and White, were tried. The jury disagreed. In the celebration after this vindication the Socialists were forced to rent an orchard for a meeting, and, it being Sunday, narrowly escaped a new prosecution under a local blue law.71

    1912—On September 5, the Socialist paper of Butte, Montana, went out with three columns of white censored spaces, far more eloquent than the expurgated text, creating a curiosity that could hardly be met when the censorship was removed.72

    1913—The Weekly Issue of Passaic, N. J., suffered from police action during the strike of the silk weavers in the latter town. The police entered Socialist headquarters and seized 500 copies of the “Weekly Issue,” the organ of the Socialist Party. Charges of theft were made against the police later, and four of them were brought before a Socialist judge and held in bail of $200 each. Next a warrant was issued for the arrest of the editor, Alexander Scott, charged with “aiding and abetting hostility to the government,” a crime punishable by 15 years at hard labor. He was arrested at a meeting held to protest against this persecution, locked up over night, and released next day on $2000 bail. He had compared the conditions in Paterson with the rule of the Cossacks. Four men who sold the paper on the street were also arrested. Scott was tried and convicted in the lower court, but the verdict was set aside by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, while the four men, after being held several days in default of bail, were released without trial.73

    A great variety of laws have been proposed and some few enacted, to curb the press. The following illustrates how extreme such measures may be:

    A law was passed in the California legislature denouncing a portrait or caricature of any living person, other than that of an office-holder within the State, without the person's written consent, unless he had been convicted of a crime. Apparently this allows the publication of likenesses of politicians and criminals only. The intent of the law was never made clear, as the newspapers disregarded it as a plain interference with the freedom of the press. The same State proposed a statute requiring the responsible writer's name to every article libellous on its face.74

    MILITARY AND EXECUTIVE CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS

    The military arm of our government has naturally had but small opportunity to censor or suppress publications. It has, however, on several occasions exercised these functions after the declaration of “martial law.” In a miners' strike in Colorado there was a repetition of Civil War methods:

    September 29, 1903, the militia arrested the working-force of the Victor “Record.” … The specific charge was based on the statement in the paper that one of the members of one of the military companies was an ex-convict. A detail of 25 infantrymen and 20 cavalrymen marched to the printing office and arrested the editor, George E. Keyner, and four employees, and took them to the bull pen. Under orders from Gov. Peabody the five men … were turned over to the sheriff on the evening of September 30. (They were later charged with criminal libel).

    On the night of December 4, Maj. H. A. Naylor called at the Daily Victor Record and informed its editor and proprietor that a censorship had been placed upon the columns of the Record. Editor Keyner was told that he must not publish anything but ordinary news matter, and was compelled to show Major Naylor proofs of

    the editorial matter which he had already written for the next morning's paper. The leading editorial was produced and the officer told the editor he must not publish it. He forbade the editor to print the official statements of the Miner's Union.75

    Articles criticizing the militia or State administration were forbidden. The office was attacked by a mob and wrecked.76

    In West Virginia, in the strike of 1912–1913, the military power arrested C. H. Boswell, editor of the Labor Argus, and held him incommunicado. Fred Merrick, a second Socialist editor who came from the Pittsburgh Justice to fill Boswell's place, was thrown into prison by the Governor's orders, and the paper confiscated. The house of the editor of the Socialist and Labor Star, one Thompson, was searched for the mailing-list of his paper, his stock damaged, and the office department locked up.

    “In Idaho … many striking miners were herded in outrageously unsanitary bull-pens by the militia of the State. An editor who foolishly believed the Constitution of Idaho to be of some importance propounded some questions in his paper, calculated to show that this conduct of the militia was in violation of the law. For asking these questions … he was also arrested and placed in the bull-pen with the others.

    FREEDOM IN THE ISLAND COLONIES

    The Federal military power has had little opportunity to interfere with freedom of the press save in our colonial possessions…. It seems to have taken advantage of this opportunity on occasion.

    In our military control of the Philippine Islands we find executive authorities arresting an American editor for republishing our own Declaration of Independence … with the excuse that it would tend to incite the Filipinos to insurrection.

    In Porto Rico, we find an American editor is subjected to some seventy or more arrests, and finally in practical effect banished from the island as the one condition on which he could escape what might prove life imprisonment … for publishing what he believed to be true concerning some carpet-bag officials appointed by the President.

    In the years since 1917, not covered by this study, the violations of civil liberty in the colonies have been more frequent.

    THE LAWS AGAINST ANARCHISTS

    The development of the laws against anarchists is an important chapter in the history of liberty. These extreme libertarians have had rather less liberty than anybody else. They present a paradox, for although they do not believe in government, they appeal to the constitutional guarantees of government for protection in the agitation of their views. Their opposition to all government, together with the fact that some few of them have both preached and practiced violence, has caused them to be regarded especially as people outside the pale. Ignorance of their philosophy has led to the confusion of anarchists with other radical groups, such as the Socialists and communists, so that they have suffered from the views of others, and others have suffered from being identified with them.

    For clearness we must distinguish the native-born anarchist from the alien, and the philosophical or Christian anarchist from the advocate of the violent overthrow of governments. The native anarchist has existed since the Utopians of the early 19th century, but his doctrines had not been regarded as dangerous, nor had he suffered suppression until after the influx of foreign-born anarchists from Germany and Russia, who fled to this country from 1848 on. They were at first received as exiled republicans from despotic monarchies in Europe coming to a land of political asylum

    as so many previous rebels against ancient tyrannies had come. As a guest the anarchist was not expected to preach or act against the United States—where it was believed none of the evils he had attacked at home could exist. But as the industrial conflict grew harsher in this country from the Civil War on, these alien agitators and their American followers began to preach their doctrines, not against foreign despots, but against American capitalists and public officials. This could not be endured, so the tradition of free political asylum was slowly abandoned for restrictive laws, federal and state, that would exclude alien anarchists and curb those already here. It is true that most of those who have suffered have been aliens, but they have suffered primarily for their opinions and so are of interest to the libertarian.

    ORIGIN OF THE ANARCHY EXCLUSION ACT

    In 1888, probably as a result of the Haymarket bomb incident in Chicago,77 resolution 1291 in the House provided for “the removal of dangerous aliens from the United States.”78 The act failed of passage. The vague term “dangerous alien” marks the beginning of the long struggle to define the person to be excluded. In 1889 Senate Bill 453 made it unlawful for “an avowed anarchist or nihilist or one who is personally hostile to the principles of the Constitution of the United States or to the form of Government,” to enter the country. The bill was violently attacked in hearings and failed. In 1890-1893 two investigations of the problem prove the continued interest.79 Yet in the Immigration Act of 1891 this proviso was included: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to apply to or exclude persons convicted of political offenses, even though they may be designated as felony or crime … by the courts of their native land.” This reveals still a strong sentiment in favor of the tradition of political asylum.80

    In 1894, probably as a result of the assassination of President Carnot of France, bills were introduced in both Houses to punish anarchy or attempts on the lives of United States

    executives, and to regulate the admission to the country of undesirable agitators. A further attempt was made to define anarchism. The Hill bill, drawn by Secretary John G. Carlisle, under Cleveland and approved by Richard Olney, Secretary of State, passed the Senate and was side-tracked in the House only by the single objection of a New York Representative.81 The old idea still persisted, however, for in 1898 the United States declined to send a representative to an international conference of secret service agents to European governments held to solve the problem presented by anarchists. (Mr. Roosevelt did suggest later making “criminal anarchy an international crime,” whatever that may be.) But the assassination of President McKinley in 1901 by an avowed anarchist renewed the agitation. On December 16, Senator Vest enquired as to a possible amendment to the Constitution to suppress anarchy. In 1903 Congress passed an immigration law with this provision82:

    Section 38: … That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to all organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to all organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity or propriety of the unlawful assault or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, shall be permitted to enter the United States … also provided that polygamists, anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the United States or of all government or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public officials, shall be excluded from the United States…. Persons who have been convicted of offenses purely political, not involving moral turpitude are excepted….

    An Act to Regulate the Admission of Aliens,
    United States Compiled Statutes, 1903, 170.

    The debate on this bill brought out a lingering defence of the tradition of political asylum, Senator Hoar declaring that there were in the world governments that he for one would overthrow by force and violence.83 The test of the law came the year of its passage. John Turner, an English subject and organizer for a labor union in England, came to New York to deliver lectures and also prepare articles on trade conditions for The Grocer, a London publication. On October 19, 1903, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor issued a warrant for his arrest and deportation. On October 23, Turner addressed a mass meeting at the Murray Hill Lyceum on “Trade Unionism and the General Strike.” He was arrested and searched. Extracts from his speech and from literature found on him were produced against him next day when a board of special enquiry was convened. He had no witnesses nor means of procuring any; he had no counsel, for the act makes no provision for procuring counsel. His trial was secret. He was not asked to define the word “anarchy.” There was no evidence that Turner had ever advocated the things prohibited by the act.84 The Board ordered Turner's deportation; an appeal to the Secretary of Commerce was dismissed. A writ of habeas corpus was sued out in the Circuit Court at New York City. The judge refused to intervene, holding the act constitutional. On appeal the United States Supreme Court decided likewise:

    DEPORTATION IS DUE PROCESS OF LAW

    Congress has power to exclude aliens and to prescribe conditions on which they may enter the United States; to establish regulations for deporting aliens who have illegally entered, and to commit the enforcement of such conditions and regulations to executive officers …. This does not deprive any person of liberty without due process of law …. The act of 1903 does not violate the Federal Constitution nor are its powers as to alien anarchists unconstitutional. Since both Board and Secretary have found for his deportation on evidence, his exclusion or deportation will not be reviewed on the facts ….

    If the word “anarchist” should be interpreted as including aliens whose anarchistic views are professed as those of political philosophers, innocent of evil intent, it would follow that Congress was of the opinion that the tendency of the general exploitation of such views is so dangerous to the public weal that aliens who hold and advocate them would be undesirable additions to our population whether permanently or temporarily, whether many or few….

    United States ex rel Turner versus Williams
    194 United States Reports 279.

    In the last paragraph the Supreme Court establishes the doctrine of “constructive anarchy” by basing its decision on the “dangerous tendency” of the exploitation of these views, “however innocent of evil intent.” The rule is first made and with general approval against the advocates of violence; next it is invoked against those philosophers who do not believe in governments lest they incite others to violence; last it is stretched to include any one who seeks to change the form of government by whatsoever means, economic or political.85 The application of these doctrines to exclude anarchist publications from the mails is discussed above under “Freedom of the Press.”

    Deportations of anarchists were unusual until after 1919, a period which is not here covered. That of Maxim Gorki, Russian novelist, political radical and social philosopher, was achieved under another provision of the immigration laws, covering exclusions for moral reasons. Gorki entered the country, but was forced to withdraw on account of a public clamor against his relations to a woman who by American interpretations was not his legal wife.

    An interesting example of the official attitude toward anarchists was the sentence in 1908 of William Buwalda of San Francisco, a private in the United States Engineers, to five years imprisonment in a military prison for attending a public meeting under anarchist auspices and shaking hands with the speaker after the lecture.

    General Funston asserts that Buwalda's action was “a great military offense, infinitely worse than desertion… a serious crime, equal to treason. The first duty of an enlisted man is unquestioning obedience and loyalty to the government to which he has sworn allegiance; it makes no difference whether he approves of that government or not.” … It is quite true that the meeting had been arranged by anarchists. Had Socialists issued the call there would have been no objection. General Funston says: “I would not have the slightest hesitancy about attending a Socialist meeting myself.” 86

    THE STATES VERSUS THE ANARCHISTS

    The States have denied the anarchists liberty to advocate their views, generally under police-power laws such as those against unlawful assembly and inciting to crime. New York led the way, having enjoyed more experience with anarchists than less cosmopolitan communities. Johann Most and Emma Goldman, the two most pursued of all anarchists in America, were convicted under such laws. The trials of Herr Most: which began in England (7 Q. B. Division 244) opened in New York City after a meeting held on November 12, 1887, the day of the hanging of the Chicago anarchists. It was suppressed, and Most and a few of his followers stole away and opened another. He was arrested and tried for inciting to violence, though his threats were made in open meeting and the only persons endangered, if any, were hundreds of miles away. The charge was brought under the Penal Statutes (3, section 451) for the punishment of three or more persons who attempt or threaten any act tending toward a breach of the peace. Again on September 7, 1901, Most was arrested for reprinting in his weekly, Freiheit, apparently by mere co-incidence on the day President McKinley was shot, an article by one Carl Hanzen, written fifty years before. The Court of Special Sessions convicted the defendant of misdemeanor.87

    The decision was based on “breach of the peace” and the “abuse of free speech.”

    THE NEW YORK CRIMINAL ANARCHY LAW

    As a result of the excitement after President McKinley's assassination, New York in 1902 put on the statute books a criminal anarchy law. An abstract follows, given so fully because this law was the progenitor of many similar laws enacted by more than thirty states during and after the World War.

    Section 468. a. Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or violence or the assassination of the executive head or any of the executive officers of the government, or by any unlawful means.

    b…. whoever by word of mouth or writing advocates, advises, or teaches the duty of criminal anarchy … prints, publishes, edits, or issues or knowingly circulates, sells, destributes or publicly displays any book, paper, document or written or printed matter in any form containing or advocating, etc…. organizes or becomes a member or voluntarily assembles with any society, group, or assembly of persons to teach or advocate such doctrines … is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than $5,000.00 or both.

    d. Whenever two or more persons assemble for the purpose of advocating or teaching the doctrines of criminal anarchy … such assembly is unlawful and every person voluntarily participating therein by his presence, aid, or instigation, is guilty of a felony, and punishable (as in section b).

    e. The owner, agent, superintendent, janitor, caretaker, or occupant of any place, building or room who wilfully and knowingly permits therein any assemblage of persons prohibited by section 468 … is guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by not more than two years imprisonment, or by a fine of not more than $2,000, or both.88

    WHAT HAPPENED TO ANARCHISTS

    The following list, with no pretensions to completeness, notes some of the violations of civil rights of anarchists in the decade 1906–1916:

    1906—February. Philadelphia. Meeting in honor of Johann Most's sixtieth birthday forcibly broken up by the police.

    —October 27. New York. Three speakers at an Anarchist meeting arrested and put under bail.

    —October 30. New York. Protest meeting against the preceding action was broken up by the police, and women clubbed.

    1907—September. General Brigham, police commissioner of New York City, prohibited the Central Federated Labor Union from displaying red flags.

    —November 11. New York Mass-meeting in commemoration of the Chicago Anarchists broken up by the police.

    1908—January. Washington, D.C. Major Sylvester, chief of police, tried to prevent Emma Goldman from speaking in the capital of the nation. He cancelled the license of the hall in which the meeting was to be held, and later issued a “temporary license” so the rights of the hall-owner to free renting might be protected.

    —Meeting in Philadelphia broken up.

    —Chicago. Hall refused for anarchist meeting.

    1909—May 23. New York. Meeting of anarchists in Lexington Hall broken up by police, with clubbing and arrests. The police tried to intimidate the hall-keeper.

    —June 8. East Orange, N. J. An address on the Drama by Emma Goldman scheduled for a Forum meeting was forbidden by the police, and official pressure forced the refusal of English's Hall, which had been rented, and the return of the deposit on the rental. Under the leadership of Alden Freeman, the meeting was held in a private barn before 1,000 people. Later the Orange

    Chapter of the Sons of the Revolution asked for Freeman's resignation.

    January 14. San Francisco. Emma Goldman was arrested to prevent her speaking. This same year she was arrested in Philadelphia and tried to secure a decision on her rights in the courts.89

    1913—April 4 and 11. New York. Disturbances in Union Square.

    —April 13. Los Angeles. Lucy Parsons, widow of Albert Parsons, one of the Chicago anarchists hung in Chicago in 1887, and George Markstall were arrested for selling literature without a license (an account of the famous Anarchists' trial). At the police station the matron made Mrs. Parsons strip for searching and tried to pull off her husband's ring.

    The police point of view toward anarchists is curtly put by a famous policeman, Robert A. Pinkerton:

    In New York the police have carried on relentless warfare against the “Reds.” They have gone even to the length of “illegally suppressing” their meetings. On one occasion I remember when a lot of anarchistic sentiments were being shouted from a speaker's stand in Union Square, the police without warrant descended upon the meeting and broke it up. This was reprehensible from the standpoint of the stickler for social and political rights; but there are certain conditions that cannot be dealt with from the ordinary point-of-view, and anarchy is one of them.90 These people should all be marked and kept under constant surveillance, and on the slightest excuse be made harmless.

    WOMEN AND CIVIL RIGHTS

    We have seen but little reason to consider the civil rights of women as women. Women were protected as men were by the Bills of Rights and could assemble, speak, print, and secure as freely the protections of law. Indeed they did things

    more freely, for since they could exert little physical force and had no vote, men were not afraid of them, and could exercise a sentimental chivalry, even if they denied justice to the “inferior sex.”

    It is true the Constitution is a charter for a man's state (hence the Nineteenth Amendment), and excluded any mention of woman as also of God. It gave her no political rights, and by silence acquiesced in her “chattel status.” This lack of political power and her economic dependence were the real restraints upon women. Moreover, social tradition and religious sentiments were effectual bars to her freedom. We do not therefore attempt any record of her economic or political status, disfranchisement, religious tabus, or the hypocrisies of the composite chivalric and Pauline doctrines as to women.

    There is one field, however, in which women have suffered as women; from a bitter and relentless sex discrimination, in the use of the police power against prostitution. The treatment of prostitutes has been one long record of invaded liberties. Search and seizure without warrant, illegal arrests and detentions, deportations without legal authority, enforced migrations by entire groups, the use of the male agent provocateur, even tarring and feathering, beating, and rail riding at the hands of mobs—these are but a few of the persecutions that have marked the treatment of this evil. This persecution of so-called “outlaws” has been so conventional that there is not even any record of their sufferings. We cannot even offer a list of cases for we have found only here and there a hint like the following:

    June, 1869. The Mayor of Pittsburgh has ordered the arrest of every woman found on the streets alone after 9 o'clock in the evening, the consequence of which is that some respectable ladies have seen the inside of the lock-up.

    As advocates of radical causes women have suffered along with men. Perhaps the longest tale is among women-workers, whether as units in industry, as strikers, or as propagandists. “Mother Jones” suffered repeated invasions of her rights;

    leaders like Elizabeth Gurley Flynn went to jail for agitation; Emma Goldman, the anarchist, was made a greater propagandist because of what she suffered from the police.91

    There was no sex distinction in these cases. The women suffered what the men suffered.

    In preaching certain moral reforms, women have also suffered, especially for abolition and temperance. This summary indicates how women advocates were treated between 1830 and 1880.

    The mobbing of Garrison in Boston took place at a women's meeting. Women were mobbed in Philadelphia, and Pennsylvania Hall burned while they were holding both abolition and temperance meetings. One of the speakers declared the slaves they defended were freer than they themselves.92 At the New York Convention, women were mobbed. The force of their faith was proven by Lucretia Mott, who being a Quaker, refused to call the police to use force to suppress the mob.93 On a speaking trip of women from Buffalo to Albany a succession of mobs broke up the meetings, or the women were prevented even from securing halls. Finally, the Mayor of Albany boldly preserved order, and gave the crusading women a testimonial. The Mayor of Boston broke up a meeting.94 In one city where they had secured a concert-hall for a public fair, their flag was torn down, and the high constable ejected them and their property into the street.95 They were practically denied the right of petition when Congress refused to consider petitions for the abolition of slavery.96 How women were interfered with in education has been told in the case of Prudence Crandall, and that of the “smelling committee.97

    We note also the refusal of certain civil rights to women. The restrictions are as old as 1684, when females were excluded from the New Haven grammar school.98 The right to follow an occupation that requires a special license was long denied in many states. Mrs. Myra Bradwell, editor of the Chicago Legal News, fully qualified as a lawyer, was refused admission to the Illinois Bar by the Supreme Court on the

    ground that “she would not be bound by the obligation necessary between client and attorney by reason of the disability imposed by her married condition.” The United States Supreme Court sustained the refusal on the ground that the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee the right to practice law as a privilege of citizens of the United States. This was the first appeal in the United States based on the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Similar struggles for the right to practice medicine and even to enter professional schools are now happily all old stories.

    THE WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT

    The suffrage movement naturally tested both the civil rights and the civil liberties of women. Under the first came the actual attempts by women to vote, and the result should at least be noted here:

    On November 5, 1872, Miss Susan B. Anthony and other women appeared at the polls in New York State, and were finally allowed to vote in the presidential election. They were prosecuted under the federal “Enforcement Act”—a measure primarily intended for political use in the Southern States then under “reconstruction.” This act made it an offence against the United States for persons not having the right to vote to cast a ballot for candidates for the House of Representatives. The suffragists claimed that their trial was unfair and that they had been denied the right to trial by jury, because the judge had instructed the jury to bring in a verdict of guilty. Miss Anthony was fined $100. The inspectors who had accepted the votes were jailed, but almost immediately released by presidential pardon.100

    Before the appearance of the so-called “militants” among the suffragists the violations of civil liberty had been irritating but not serious. Meetings were broken up by disorder and hooliganism which went unpunished by the police. Both hooligan and policeman merely reflected the current sentiment of

    ridicule. Such incidents as this necessarily accompany any new movement:

    Susan B. Anthony went to Southern Oregon in 1879 and while sojourning in Jacksonville, she was assailed with a shower of eggs, since known as “Jackson arguments” in that section, and she was also burned in effigy on a principal street after the sun went down.101

    By 1913 the increasing political power of the women of the country through their votes in many States, and the widespread endorsement of their demand for federal action, had brought them into conflict with the police power. The struggle centered in Washington, D.C. The first failure to police protection was when the Capital police and military allowed hoodlums to mob and almost break up a parade of suffragists on March 3, 1913, the day preceding Mr. Wilson's first inauguration. The Inauguration Parade was perfectly policed.

    Thereafter the “militants”—members of the Congressional Union for Equal Suffrage, later the Woman's Party—pressed for the passage of a constitutional amendment granting equal suffrage, and sought to secure the President's endorsement and political aid by direct petition and interview. When these failed, they stationed a picket of some half dozen women at the White House gates with suffrage banners, (January 10, 1917). June 20 and 21 some rioting and flag-snatching occurred over a banner on which was blazoned the statement of Elihu Root, one of the American mission to Russia, that the United States enjoyed equal suffrage. Meanwhile the United States had entered the World War, and the popular psychology had been worked into the belief that this challenging of our democracy was disloyal and unpatriotic, and should be abandoned until the return of peace.

    The authorities, unintelligent and overwrought by the prevalent war hysteria, undertook the police suppression of this dangerous movement and arrested six women on June 24, and tried them in the police Court of the District of Columbia on the technical charge of “obstructing traffic,”—an ancient

    ally of suppression. The defense claimed their right to picket, citing their five months' immunity from arrest, and charged that it was the arrest not the picketing that produced obstruction of traffic. They were found guilty of violating the police ordinance and the act of Congress, fined $25 each or the choice of three days in the District jail. They chose jail.

    On July 4, thirteen women were arrested for disorderly conduct,—due to the resistance of one woman when spectators seized from her copies of The Suffragist she had been selling for weeks. Eleven women served three days in jail. July 14, sixteen women were arrested and given sixty days in the District Workhouse at Occoquan, Virginia, for obtsructing traffic. They claimed to be political prisoners, but suffered treatment which they regarded as calculated indignity. After three days they were pardoned by the President without explanation. August 14, 15, and 18, a banner addressed to “Kaiser Wilson” produced serious riot, that at Cameron House, suffragette headquarters, being thus described:

    Miss Lucy Burns stood on the threshold with a banner in her hand. Three sailors in uniform sprang on her, dragged her to the curb and tore the banner to bits…. Others brought a ladder … climbed to the second balcony and tore down the “Kaiser Wilson” banner, the American flag, and the Woman's Party flag. One sailor struck Miss Georgiana Sturgis…. The mob had been assembled for over an hour. Shortly before five o'clock a bullet was fired through one of the windows … passing about 18 inches over the head of Mrs. Ella Dean…. The police reserves cleared the street about quarter to five….102

    The value of flags and other property destroyed during this week according to the women was $1,440. The total police action was the arrest of six women on technical charges.

    The arrests continued from week to week, but we note only the high spots. September 4, twelve women were given sixty days, and some were placed in solitary confinement for protesting against conditions in Occoquan workhouse. By October

    15, four women were given the maximum sentence of six months as an alternative of a $25 fine. On October 20, Alice Paul, the leader of this movement, and Dr. Caroline Spencer, were recalled under suspended sentences and given six months with one additional month. Miss Paul went on a hunger strike, was removed to the District jail, at one time was confined in the psychopathic ward as a test of her sanity, and was forcibly fed for 21 days and then released in very weak physical condition. The next group were sent to Occoquan (except one). They struck at their treatment and the refusal to consider them political prisoners. No one could see them, not even their lawyer. Sixteen refused food, some for ten days. Lucy Burns, a leader, was handcuffed to the bars of her cell. Their attorney had to secure a writ of habeas corpus from the United States Judge Waddill, Eastern District of Virginia, on the ground that they were illegally incarcerated in Occoquan workhouse when they had been sentenced to the District jail. The writ originally returnable November 28, was dated ahead to the twenty-third for fear the hunger strike might produce serious consequences. At the hearing it was admitted that the only basis for the transfer of the women was “a verbal order made five or six years ago.” Judge Waddill in summing up said:

    The locking up of thirty human beings is an unusual sort of thing and judicial officers ought to be required to stop long enough to see whether some prisoners ought to go and some not; whether some might not be killed by going; or whether they should go, dead or alive. This class of prisoners and this number of prisoners should have been given special consideration. You ought to lawfully lock them up instead of unlawfully lock them up—if they are to be locked up…. The petitioners are, therefore, one and all, in the workhouse without semblance of authority or legal process of any kind… they will accordingly be remanded to the Washington jail.

    All thirty were returned to the district jail from which they were liberated four days later on the order of the sentencing judge, A.R. Mullowny, who refused to give a reason for his summary order.103

    In the summer of 1918 the arrests were resumed. August 6, forty-eight women were arrested for trying to speak from the base of a statue in a park opposite the White House. Some were arrested before they had spoken. They were charged with assembling in a public park without a permit. After a postponement by the government this was changed to a charge of violating a section of the Peace and Order Act which provides against loud and boisterous talking, comment on passers-by and indecent or profane language. Others were charged with climbing on a monument. Twenty-six women were sent to a man's workhouse, abandoned as unfit for habitation, where all but two hunger-struck. They were released after five days. The suffrage amendment was considered in the Senate on September 26, when President Wilson urged the measure because he “wanted a spiritual instrument.” In the debate Senator Cummins of Iowa said:

    I do not believe these women committed any crime, and while I have not particle of sympathy with the manner in which they conducted their campaign, I think their arrest and imprisonment, and the treatment they received while in confinement are a disgrace to the civilized world and much more a disgrace to the United States which assumes to lead the civilized world in humane endeavor.

    In December and January, 1919, the militants burned President Wilson's books and speeches with ceremonies and kept fires burning in Lafayette Park. Eleven were brought to trial and fined $5 or given five days for starting bonfires between sunset and sunrise. This was reported in the Paris press.

    When President Wilson landed at Boston from Europe, in February, the local suffragists made a demonstration and several were arrested for “loitering”; three on Boston Common. They were sent to the House of Detention with sentences for

    eight days. An anonymous person paid their fines so they were released. The final demonstration was before the Metropolitan Opera House in New York where the President was making a speech. The suffrage pickets were roughed by the police and crowd, and five arrested charged with “disorderly conduct” but later released. (See Jailed for Freedom by Doris Stevens.) Meanwhile in the election of 1918 the suffragists claimed to have defeated five out of seven Democratic Senators in western states. The Congress went Republican. This evidence of power brought not only freedom of speech and assembly but the suffrage amendment itself which was passed by the House on May 21, by 304 to 89, and by the Senate on June 4, by 66 to 30. The reversal from police persecution to constitutional recognition is a startling proof that those who have power enjoy liberty.

    FREEDOM OF TEACHING

    Freedom of teaching is not a civil liberty. No constitutional guarantee protects either teacher or student. The concern of the constitutions of some States with education is to guarantee that schools be provided by the community, with length of terms, language to be used, and compulsory attendance, specified in several instances.104 But in its elements teaching is a combined exercise of the rights of free assemblage, free speech, and free press. It is the source of all true progress in social liberty however much politics may try to obscure the point that all freedom in government should be to quicken the process of education in large masses of people. Therefore, freedom of teaching in the large sense, includes freedom for the pulpit and for the arts, including the drama.

    Freedom of teaching means, technically, that the individual teacher, or the faculty, or teaching group, shall be free to teach as their consciences see the truth without dictation from the State authority or private boards, through their economic control of positions and advancement. The problem of university control is not within the province of civil liberty105 but the importance and increasing acuteness since 1885 of the

    old and familiar struggle for academic freedom in American colleges and universities urges a brief list of cases. They will be found to be connected with the other issues of industrial and social freedom.

    The struggle began early in this country, with the disciplining of the first president of the first College, Henry Dunster, of Harvard,106 who displayed an independence rare in later university presidents.

    There was an amusing paradox during the Revolution when the Tory President of King's College, now Columbia University, having been vanquished in a debate by young Alexander Hamilton, was disciplined by the patriot students and townspeople. The intolerance toward Quaker teachers at this time has been described. (See page 8.) It is probable that cases occurred before the Civil War involving religious orthodoxy though there is little record of such events. The failure to reappoint a professor (as this was the method of discipline) did not secure general notice. The cases arising out of anti-slavery agitation have been noted. (Page 120.)

    Since the Civil War, the cases fall into three groups: the theological (1859–1890); the economic-political (1885–1900); and the social (1897–1917).107 To these must be added the War cases (1917–1918). This extended list of dismissals of teachers for their dissent from the popular view of the World War is not here covered.

    The theological cases simply continued the old dispute between science and religion, the casus belli at this time being the doctrine of evolution.108 For example, in the seventies Professor Winchell was forced out of Vanderbilt University for a difference of view on theology. In 1884, Dr. James Woodrow, professor of Natural Science and Revealed Religion in the Presbyterian Seminary of South Carolina, was forced to resign for advocating in his classes the doctrine of evolution. The University of South Carolina gave this relative of the future President of the United States a chair in science.109 At Princeton in the eighties arose a controvesry over the orthodoxy of the celebrated president, Dr. James McCosh; and a

    little later, Professor Charles Toy of the chair of Semitic languages in the Louisville Theological Seminary, was forced to withdraw from that institution. He accepted a chair at Harvard.

    The marked increase of cases since about 1890, especially in the departments of economics and government, coincides with our vast industrial expansion, the struggle between labor and capital, and the replacing on University boards of control of the representatives of religion with the representatives of the state or of great wealth. Men began to differ not on eternity, but on society, and were punished as of old lest they contaminate the young. The new importance of the social sciences with their research into actual present conditions, and the presentation of their statistical revelations on the evils of our industrial system, revelations that could not be blotted out by political manipulation, aroused certain vested interests to the need for weeding out and silencing these intellectual mar-plots. University extension and extra-mural labors had brought the teacher into touch with vital problems in the community life. He had to speak out—and then, to fight for freedom. He had to resist too the stifling effects on himself, his ideas, and his teaching, of the munificent gifts to universities from men of vast wealth and power. There follows a brief list of type cases. It does not pretend to be exhaustive; nor does it pretend to decide the disputed details in each case, whether for example the word “dismissed” means that a teacher was forced to resign, or simply dropped from the next year's teaching staff. No final judgment on the facts is offered.

    In 1893 George D. Herron was dismissed from Iowa College on account of his radical views on marriage. He was a Socialist and it has been held that his political views were urged against him. His views were also brought into the record when in 1919 President Wilson appointed him to a War commission. In 1895, Professor E. W. Bemis, associate professor of economics and sociology was dropped from the faculty of the University of Chicago, because he opposed the

    granting of franchises to certain public utility corporations, and for criticizing the railroads during the Pullman strike of 1894. In 1896, President E. Benjamin Andrews of Brown University expressed views on the money question then agitating the nation, and was severely criticized. He withdrew as president in 1899. In 1900 Edward A. Ross, professor of sociology, was forced to resign from Leland Stanford University because he had expressed economic opinions not approved of by the widow of Senator Leland Stanford, founder of the University. President David Starr Jordan found himself in the embarrassing necessity of disciplining Professor Ross, though he denied that economic questions governed the action.110 In 1911 Professor E. M. Banks was dismissed from the University of Florida for writing an article in The Indecent on the Civil War. In the same year, Arthur W. Calhoun, of the department of history and economics, was dismissed from the Florida State College for his views on Socialism. (See The Independent, August, 1911.) In 1915 Professor Calhoun was dismissed from Maryville College, Kentucky, and in 1918, he was refused reappointment at Clark University because he had refused to sign an enforced loyalty pledge. In 1912–1913, Dr. John M. Mecklin resigned from the Department of Philosophy in Lafayette College under pressure for a failure in orthodoxy. This case was investigated by joint Committees of the American Philosophical and the American Psychological Societies of which Dr. Mecklin was a member. He was vindicated by the report.111 This same year Willard C. Fisher was suspended from Wesleyan College, Connecticut, ostensibly for a humorous remark in an address suggesting that the churches be closed for a while so that people might find out their usefulness to religion. The deeper animus was probably against Professor Fisher's activities in public affairs. In 1914, Dr. Scott Nearing, instructor in economics in the Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania, was denied promotion on account of his statistical enquiries into local and state corporate and public service enterprises. Dr. Clyde Kins was also disciplined by
    Pennsylvania.112 About the same time, Dr. Joseph K. Hart, sociologist, was forced out of the University of Washington because the authorities believed his extension lectures implied an interest in politics.

    In 1914 as a result of the lengthening list of teachers who had been disciplined for their opinions, and as a result of the joint action of the American Political Science Society, the Sociological Society, and the Economics Association in investigating the case of Professor Willard Fisher, and because of similar action in other cases by the Philosophical and Psychological Societies, there was organized the American Association of University Professors. Its chief function has been to define and protect by investigation and report the rights of teachers in our institutions. The formation of such a union was one of many signs in the United States just prior to 1917 of a wide-spread feeling that we were enjoying much less liberty than our traditions were supposed to guarantee. The reader is invited to study the authoritative reports of this Association for evidence as to the suppression of academic freedom. Less authoritative, but not less informative, is The Goose Step by Upton Sinclair.

    These cases reveal no denial of any constitutional right. The courts can rarely be invoked even on the contractual questions involved since the status of the professional contract assumed in most cases permits easy and swift severance of relations. The offending teacher is simply disposed of; rarely, by immediate and conclusive action after the offense, but generally by indirect and dilatory action in order to prevent any clear issue of academic freedom. Publicity is avoided by granting the teacher a year's leave without pay, during which time he is supposed to resign; or pressure is brought to make him resign at the term end. The economic weapon is usually the simplest—simply failure to advance the salary or rank of an offender, or simply failure to reappoint him. In most cases there is a combination of economic and social pressure to prevent the exercise of a special gift for making a living in a profession of limited opportunities, and to injure his professional reputation

    and prestige. The worst danger here as elsewhere is intimidation. Fear keeps many teachers, none too bold at best, from voicing what they know to be true about the society that surrounds them, or the history they are supposed to interpret. Most of them are not fighters. They are experts on information, with a desire to be let alone in their work. So when their opinions are disapproved, their position and experience are not such as can resist intimidation. The young scholar learns early he can succeed best by silence. There is little academic freedom in the sense of the right to teach without institutional coercion or censorship of personal faiths.

    In religion and in pure science freedom of belief has been won. Teachers can hold any faith or none, and adopt what physics and cosmology they wish though it is wise not to announce one's atheism from the roofs. The schools are at least neutral. But in other fields there is little freedom enough,—for teaching new economic or social philosophies, for discussion of sex, for disseminating what may be called internationalized history, or for radical ideas of anarchism or spiritism. The recent legislation against teaching the doctrine of evolution does not fall within our period.

    In one department of science, medicine, there has been a constant struggle against both religious and social pressure. Even in 1727 in Boston, we were having a dispute about inoculation which still flourishes in the anti-vaccinationist. The issue as to who is to have control over a man's body, himself or society, is very confusing. But generally it is being decided in favor of society, which protects itself against the danger to public health arising from a failure to conform. The right to resist state vaccination is not held as a civil liberty. Even such a personal matter as the prevention of conception is held to be within the police power of the state. The opponents of dissection, of vivisection, or of cremation get no sympathy—these things serve the state. Yet there are methods of social amelioration against which instinct and prejudice draws a line, e. g., the sterilization of the human unfit. As to euthanasia

    witness the outburst against Dr. Osler's jocular proposal for killing off persons of a certain age, and the storm over a Chicago doctor's refusal to operate to save the life of a hopelessly crippled infant. In practical medicine, there have been continued efforts to prevent treatment by Christian Science, faith healing, spiritism, etc. These fall more directly into questions of religious freedom.113

    The most serious danger to liberty is in the modern conception of public education. Here we are having compulsory education by the state in the ideas the state prescribes. These ideas are composed of the demand of the popular mind, plus the interjected ideas of economic powers, who through many processes exercise a considerable influence on education. Education is censored by the press and the electorate with the design of standardizing the commonplace, and leaving no room for the radical, the experimenter, or the creator.

    The public school and compulsory education can be made the foundation of a servile state. Both teachers and students will learn the traditional history, support the established government, conform to all the conventions, until the schools become machines for the production of conventional patriots with no ideals of liberty and no desire for it.

    The control is exercised through public or private boards acting on teaching and teachers. The content and method of teaching are prescribed with certain factors such as flag saluting and sometimes religious observances. But the latter has been largely eliminated, through judicial decision. The question of saluting the American flag has arisen in case of Socialists who did not want their children taught nationalistic patriotism. The use of a prescribed language makes for more perfect conformity. Alien groups have tried to preserve the rights to their own tongues, but almost universally without success.

    Of course children can attend private schools. But the state through its superior power is rapidly extending its monopoly of all primary and secondary education. Moreover there is an increasing tendency to punish those who teach

    doctrines disapproved by the established government. The school that advocated a radical change in such a form and openly announced that it had taught children this creed would find itself sooner or later prosecuted for sedition, anarchy, or immorality. Moreover, the source of all teachers, private as well as public has come under control. The university does not produce the radical teacher.

    NOTES

    1 Frank J. Goodnow, The American Conception of Liberty, p. 21.

    2 E. Freund, Police Power, pp. 9–11.

    3 Police Power, p. 11.

    4 C. G. Tiedemann, Limitations on Police Power (2 vols.), contains a discussion of these points.

    5 Loc. cit.

    6 Brunk v. Stratton, 176 New York Reports 150, decision by Justice Cullen of the Court of Appeals.

    7 United States v. Moore, 104 Federal Reporter 78. The case arose over words published by Moore in The Blue Grass Blade. The opinion of the court is in The Truthseeker Annual (1895). See also Theodore Schroeder, Constitutional Freedom of Speech Defined and Defended, chap. vi. For Chancellor Kent's opinion in the Ruggles case see above pp. 38–39, and Schroeder, op. cit.

    8 Schroeder, op. cit., is based on this case. See also The Outlook, CXV, 96–97.

    9 See above chap. II for school question in Know-Knothing period.

    10 Both major parties did the same thing in 1924. The present chapter does not consider the revival of the Ku Klux Klan, or modern anti-Semitism.

    11 S. H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America, pp. 522–3.

    12 People v. Pierson, 176 New York Reports 201.

    13 For the text see MacDonald, Selected Statutes (1861–1898), p. 42.

    14 United States v. Reynolds, 98 United States Reports 145.

    15 United States Reports, 1–40.

    16 John Nicholson, The Tennessee Massacre, p. 6.

    17 See Clifford P. Smith, Christian Science and Legislation, (passim); Alfred Farlow, The Relation of the Government to the Practice of Christian Science; Peter V. Ross, “Metaphysical Treatment of Disease,” Yale Law Journal, XXIV, No. 1, Nov., 1914; John D. Work, The Public Health Service, speech in United States Senate, January 5, 1915; Wm. A. Purrington, “Manslaughter, Christian Science and the Law,” Medical Record, November 26, 1898. The basic English case against a parent for a failure to call in a doctor for a sick child is Regina v. Wagstaff, 10 Cox Criminal Cases 531.

    18 Proceedings, Vol. IX. This volume will repay careful study. It lists many cases. See also above for freedom of speech and assemblage with respect to labor movements.

    19 Ibid., p. 4–5. The present volume is evidence that Professor Ross is inaccurate when he declares these rights were “established so long ago.” They have never been established in fact.

    20 Industrial Relations Commission, 1915, Principal Report, pp. 98 to 100, under “Policing Industry.” See the testimony of Gilbert Roe, II, p. 10,471; Theodore Schroeder, p. 10,841; Samuel Gompers, p. 10,853; S. S. Gregory, p. 10,535; Harris Weinstock, p. 10,573; W. D. Haywood, p. 10,572. See Schroeder, Free Speech for Radicals, pp. 8, 100, et seq. Case and Comment, XXII, p. 455.

    21 E. Freund, Police Power, sec. 165; see A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, chaps. vi and vii, and note v. He notes the basic English cases; Reg. v. Carlile, 6 C. and P. 628; Reg. v. Burns, 16 Cox C. C. 335; Reg. v. Ernest Jones, 6 State Trials (n. s.) 783, and Reg. v. Fussell, ditto, 723.

    22 Proceedings, p. 16. Per contra, we must note the historic devotion of the Boston Common to public meetings; the establishment in Cleveland Civic Center of three formal stone pulpits, the inspiration of Mayor Tom Johnson; and the sensible liberality displayed by Col. Arthur Wood as Police Commissioner of New York City.

    23 John Graham Brooks says, op. cit., “I was in two company-owned towns in Colorado…. The school-houses (owned by the companies) could no more have been secured for free assemblages at that time than the Catholic Church could have been hired for an A. P. A. dance.”

    24 The complex legal aspects may be studied in the following cases: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, 211; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (see p. 552 for opinion on Bill of Rights amendments and list of other cases); Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616; Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43; State v. Hunter, 106 North Carolina 796; Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Georgia 567; Commonwealth v. Abrans, 156 Massachusetts 57; Love v. Thalan, 128 Michigan 545; Citizens Bank v. Board of Assessors, 54 Federal 73; African Church v. City of New Orleans, 15 Louisiana 441; Daley v. Superior Court, 112 California 97; People v. Wallace, 85 App. Division, N. Y. 170; People v. Judson, 11 Daly (N. Y.) 83; People v. Tylkoff, 212 New York 197; Vanarsdale v. Laverty, 69 Pennsylvania 103.

    25 Dr. Kate Baldwin, of Philadelphia, introduced a bill in the Pennsylvania legislature to legalize the birth control movement. The general crusade against the idea has subsided, and it has become in many places almost respectable.

    26 Nations cannot agree on this question. In England, since 1900, the principle has been that the government has nothing to do with the guidance of public opinion, and that the sole duty of the state is to punish libels of all kinds. But in France and other Continental nations, it is held the right and duty of the state to guide the literature of the country. A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, chap. vi, “Right to Freedom of Discussion,” quoting Dalloz, Repertoire, XXXVI. An Englishman lists these four principal conditions upon which freedom of discussion reposes: (1) a common faith in the rationality of the individual citizen; (2) a sense of external and internal security; (3) a conviction that discussion of any given subject cannot in the last resort be suppressed; (4) that the state must be the final arbiter of discussion for the sake of law and order. E. S. P. Hayes, The Case for Liberty, p. 59.

    27 See chapter III. This refusal of equal service was justified by Attorney-General Cushing: “Congress does not assert its right to carry into a State, matter which the State regards as seditious or objectionable.” 8 Cushing's Opinions 489.

    28 Louis F. Post, editor of The Public, described the process: “The coterie would at first carefully limit the censorship to … matter most intensely offensive to public morals. A vast majority of the people, their thoughts centered upon offenses against morality and drawn away from offenses against liberty, would cordially approve the innovation. The courts, keen to see that a decision in favor of a minor offender would make a precedent, favorable to the repulsive class, would prefer making a precedent against liberty in the guise of a precedent for morality…. The censorship would then be extended to less offensive matter.” “Our Advancing Postal Censorship,” in The Public, VIII, 290–291.

    29 In the principal lottery case the Court held: “The freedom of communication is not abridged, unless Congress is absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall or shall not be carried in the mails and compelled arbitrarily to assist in the dissemination of matters condemned by its judgment through the governmental agencies it controls.” In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110. See Clearing House v. Coyne, 194, U. S. 108.

    30 “Nor can the department undertake to state what would or would not be mailable in advance of the matter being actually presented for transmission in the mails.” Letter to the publishers of The Public, VIII, 819. The regular instructions to subordinates read: “The postmaster shall not give opinions to the public.”

    31 Louis F. Post, “Our Despotic Postal Censorship,” The Public, VIII, 815.

    32 Report, with Hearings, on the Second Postal Rates, by a Committee of Congress (1906–1907). Some 98 per cent of 4,652 weeklies, 99 per cent of 103 dailies, and 97 per cent of 186 monthlies, favored the right of court review. See pages 27, 32, 164, 495, and 676 for points in this connection.

    33 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 733; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616; Arbitary Searches and Seizures, The Greenbag, XVIII, 273 (1906). Francis Leiber has some fine words on private correspondence in his Civil Liberty and Self-Government, chap. ix, 90–94.

    34 In re Wahl, 42 Fed. Rep. 822 (May 12, 1890); 56 U. S. 604; 162 U. S. 420. Freund, Police Power, sec. 48 covers secrecy of letters and telephone messages.

    35 Hoover v. McChesney, 81 Fed. Rep. 472.

    36 It is possible that fraud orders may be inspired by special interests against those whose financial methods they disapprove. A fraud ban against the use of the second-class mails was issued against one E. G. Lewis, and his People's Bank, of St. Louis, Mo., based on the alleged financial condition of his bank. Later investigation failed to prove that the alleged condition had existed. It was charged that more orthodox financiers had instigated the suppressive action to rid themselves of a dangerous competitor for the people's savings. See Louis F. Post, “The Growing Power of Our Postal Censorship,” The Public, VIII, 420; Statement of the Postmaster General to the Press, July 9, 1905; House Reports, No. 1601, 62nd Congress, 3rd session; Lewis v. Morgan, 229 U. S 288; United States Bank v. Henry J. Gilson, et al. (Opinion by Judge Smith McPherson, United States District Court, Eastern Missouri.)

    37 Chapter III gives early cases of such prosecutions.

    38 17 Statutes at Large 599, c. cclvii, revising section 148 of the postal regulations. Congress has previously passed a less precise and embracing law (March 3, 1865), which was enlarged to include obscene matter on the outside of envelopes, June 8, 1872. The facts about the Comstock Law are noteworthy. “The history of the statute … is by no means creditable. It was one of the 200 acts passed as pendents to the Omnibus Bill by the corrupt Congress, notorious for the Credit Mobilier and Back Pay legislation, under the suspension of the rules during the last minutes before 12 o'clock P.M., and was signed with the same indecorous haste by the President who was sick in bed, and did not read them.” C. L. James, An Appeal to the Women of America (pamphlet), p. 7, note. H. L. Mencken in the article “Puritanism as a Literary Force in A Book of Prefaces, p. 258, writes: “All opposition, if only the opposition of inquiry was overborne in the usual manner. That is to say, every Congressman who presumed to ask what it was all about, or to point out obvious defects in the bill, was disposed of by the insinuation, or even the direct charge, that he was a covert defender of obscene books, and by inference, of the carnal recreations described in them.” U. S. Criminal Code, pp. 211–212–245.

    39 Now sections 1141, 1142, 1143 of the Penal Laws of New York. See Charles Gallaudet Trumbull, Anthony Comstock, Fighter, p. 157, for statistics of cases prosecuted by Comstock until his death (1915). See also Mencken, op. cit., p. 258 ff.

    40 Report of the Trial of E. H. Heywood; Boston Globe, Jan. 9, 1878.

    41 24 Federal Cases 14,571; 16 Blatch, 338; 30 N. Y. Supplement 361.

    42 U. S. v. Harman, 45 Federal Reporter 414, affirmed in 50 Federal Reporter 921. See The Kansas Fight for a Free Press (pamphlet) by the Lucifer Publishing Co., Valley Falls, Kan., which reprinted the four offending articles; and Arguments in Support of the Demurrer to the Indictment of M. Harman, E. C. Walker and George Harman, by G. C. Clemens and David Overmeyer.

    43 Louis Post, articles cited above, The Public, August 12, and October 12, 1905; March 6, 1906.

    44 U. S. v. Bennett, 16 Blatchford, 368–9.

    45 Idem, 362; People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 411; U. S. v. Clark, 38 Fed. Rep. 734.

    46 U.S. v. Heywood, see U. S.v. Bennett, supra.

    47 U.S. v. Slenker, 32 Fed. Rep. 693; People v. Muller (see above) Anti-Vice Motion Picture Co. v. Bell, in New York haw Journal, September 22, 1916; Sociological Research Film Corporation v. City of New York, 83 Misc. 815; Steele v. Bannon, 7 L. R. C. L. series 267; U. S. v. Means, 42 Fed. Rep. 605, etc.

    48 Birth Control Review, December, 1918. For prosecutions under various local ordinances see section on Freedom of Speech and Assemblage, page 277. The history of this movement in conflict with repressive opinion can be followed in Victor Robinson, Pioneers of Birth Control.

    49 Margaret Sanger, The Suppressed Obscene Articles (pamphlet) contains the text of the three articles, “The Prevention of Conception,” “Open Discussion,” and “The Birth Control League.”

    50 Hobart Coomer v. U. S., 213 Fed. Reporter 1. The brief for Coomer presented to the Circuit Court by Theodore Schroeder contains some interesting points on the constitutionality of the prosecution.

    51 United States v. Fred Warren (not reported in the digests).

    52 For Taft's opinion see Report of Federal Relations Commission of 1915, p. 47; the case is Warren v. U. S., 183 Federal Reporter 718. The court repeated the old philosophy of the censorship: “The unrestricted use of the mails is not one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution…. Liberty and freedom of speech do not mean the unrestrained right to do or say what one pleases at all times and under all circumstances…. The idea of government implies some restraint in the interest of the general welfare, gradually enlarged… designed to exclude from the mails that which tends to debauch the morals of the people or despoil them of their property.”

    53 B. O. Flower, Story of the Menace Trial, pp. 19–29.

    54 United States v. Bernarr Macfadden, 165 Federal 51.

    55 Manifesto of Magon, et al., Mother Earth, II, 548.

    56 Senate Document 426, 60th Congress, 1st Session.

    57 See Lindsay Rogers, “Federal Interference with Freedom of the Press,” 23 Yale Law Journal (May, 1914); the New York Sun, March 24, 1908; cf. 27 Harvard Law Review (November, 1913).

    58 25 Statutes at Large, 1129, chap. 321, sec. 211. See Mother Earch, III, 64; and 36 U. S. Statutes at Large, part 1, 1339, for the inclusion of arson in this legislative catch-all.

    59 Whitman replied: “Yours of the 21st received with the curious list (I suppose of course from the district attorney) of “suggestions,” lines, pages, pieces, etc., to be expunged. The list, whole and several, is rejected by me, and will not be thought of under any circumstances.”

    60 See Mencken, A Book of Prefaces, p. 270 ff. and an article by Channing Pollock in the Bulletin of the Author's League, March, 1917.

    61 The case of the People v. August Muller, 96 New York Reports 408, in which Muller was indicted, October, 1884, under section 317 of the Penal Code, of New York, for showing obscene pictures exemplifies the difficulty of defining the obscene, and the difference in view between the artist and the mass mind.

    62 United States Compiled Statutes, 1916, p. 6389. The implication as to the possible morality (and perhaps competitive quality) of the foreign-born pictures is not without humor.

    63 Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236 United States Reports 230; Mutual Film Co. v. Hodges, 236 United States Reports 247.

    64 Frolich and Schwartz, The Law of Motion Pictures, p. 383, et passim.

    65 T. Schroeder, Free Speech for Radicals, p. 7.

    66 35 Colorado Reports 253.

    67 Patterson v. United States, 205 United States Reports 464.

    68 Henry Schofield, “Freedom of the Press,” p. 114, in Proceedings of the American Sociological Association, 1914.

    69 Mother Earth, Vol. VIII.

    70 Cutler, Lynch Law, p. 229.

    71 The International Socialist Review, July, 1910.

    72 John Graham Brooks, Proceedings of American Sociological Society, IX, 16.

    73 Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, 1915, Report, I, 55; International Socialist Review, June, 1913, p. 853.

    74 Henry P. Brown, “Liberty of the Press,” American Law Review, May-June, 1900.

    75 Carroll D. Wright, Labor Trouble in Colorado, p. 187.

    76 Wright, op. cit., p. 261; Rastall, Labor History of the Cripple Creek District.

    77 See above chap. VII.

    78 Compare with the provision of a similar sort in the Alien Act (1798), above chap. II.

    79 House Report 3492, by a Select Committee of the Two Houses; Senate Report 2333, by the Senate Committee on Immigration, February 22, 1893, 52nd Congress, 2nd session.

    80 Edgar Lee Masters, Brief in Turner's Case, p. ii; Compiled Statutes, 1901, p. 1224.

    81 Congressional Record, August 17, 1894, House Report 3472.

    82 The outburst against anarchy was very intolerant. See James M. Black, “The Suppression of Anarchy,” American Law Review, XXXVI, 190, and address to the New York State Bar Association, 1902; “The Prevention of Presidential Assassination,” North American Review, No. 541, p. 173; Gen. Lew Wallace wanted to change the constitutional definition of treason “and for the suppression of such acts Congress shall have the power to do whatever it may judge requisite.”

    83 Congressional Record, XXXVI, part 1, p. 44.

    84 See Edgar Lee Masters and Clarence Darrow, Brief for Turner, pp. 97–99, before the United States Supreme Court. This presents valuable statements on the principles of civil liberty involved in the anarchist exclusion act.

    85 For the general right of the United States to expel persons dangerous to the State, see Fong Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, and Teun v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257. The principle that an executive order from the immigration commissioner is final, constitutes due process of law, and will not be reviewed by the courts, had been declared after the Immigration Act of 1891 in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 657.

    86 New York World, July 19, 1908, letter by Emma Goldman. See the New York Evening Post, June 30, 1908, statement by Gen. Funston.

    87 126 New York Reports 108; 171 New York Reports 423.

    88 See also T. Schroeder, The Criminal Anarchy Law, on suppressing the advocacy of crime, Publications of the Free Speech League, N. Y., 1907.

    89 Goldman v. Reyburn, et al., 28 Pennsylvania District Reports 883. See Proceedings of the Sociological Society, quoted supra, p. 44.

    90 “Detective Surveillance of Anarchists,” The North American Review, CLXXIII, 615 (No. 540, Nov., 1901).

    91 Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, 1915, testimony of Crystal Eastman on “The Political, and Industrial Status of Women,” II, 10,782.

    92 Susan B. Anthony, History of Woman's Suffrage in the United States, I, 326, 329, 341; McMaster, History of the United States, VI, 490.

    93 Anthony, op. cit., I, 546, 571; 467–468.

    94 McMaster, op. cit., p. 284.

    95 Anthony, op. cit., p. 343.

    96 Anthony, op. cit., p. 338.

    97 See above chaps. II and III; and McMaster, op. cit., VI, 78. The files of The Lily, edited in New York by Amelia Bloomer, are interesting evidence.

    98 E. A. Hecker, History of Women's Rights, p. 168; McMaster, History, I, 125. The end is not yet here as is shown by the present agitation for a 20th Amendment to the Constitution, guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of women throughout the United States.

    99 Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wallace's Reports 130; see Anthony, op. cit., II, 601–626. In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. Reports 116 declares that the Virginia Supreme Court had a right to interpret the statute regulating admission to the bar, against women.

    100 Anthony, op. cit., II, 627. In Missouri Mrs. Minor sued an officer of election for refusing to accept her vote. In 1875, in this case, the United States Supreme Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer the right of suffrage on all the citizens of the United States as one of their privileges and immunities.

    101 Anthony, op. cit., III, 446, 775.

    102 The Suffragist, August 18, 1917.

    103 The Suffragist, December 1, 1917.

    104 F. J. Stimson, Law of State and Federal Constitutions.

    105 See J. McKeen Cattell, University Control; Evans Clarke, University Government (unpublished).

    106 See L. R. Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties, under religious liberties.

    107 U. G. Weatherly, “Freedom of Teaching in the United States,” Sociological Society's Proceedings, IX, 144–146; and Ibid, “Reasonable Restrictions Upon the Scholar's Freedom” by Henry S. Pritchett.

    108 See Andrew D. White, The Warfare of Science and Religion (2 vols.).

    109 White, op. cit., I, 70–88, 313, and bibliography.

    110 See Report of the American Economic Association, IX, 166.

    111 Proceedings of the American Psychological Society, 1914.

    112 See Publications, American Association of University Professors, II, No. 3, part 2; and Lightner Witmer, The Nearing Case.

    113 See p. 273, supra.

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